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A LAW STUDENT IN THE SUPREME COURT:
UNITED STATES V. DRAYTON AND THE FUTURE
OF CONSENT SEARCH ANALYSIS
Dennis J. Callahan*
In my third year of law school, I hit the student note lottery. Like thousands
of law students, the year before I had analyzed a legal issue in my student note.
Despite my passion for the issue, I felt like many others that this was a warming-
up exercise, a preliminary to my real future as a lawyer. However, the narrow
issue I examined soon came before the Supreme Court and months later, I found
myself in the Supreme Court watching oral arguments in a case I helped prepare.
I would like to tell my story not only to relive an amazing episode in my own new
career, but also to remind law students of the powerful legal tool that the student
note can be. I will also recap and look forward from this important moment in
consent search jurisprudence in which I was lucky to play a part.
Part I of this Article is my story. It outlines the topic and content of my student
note and describes my whirlwind journey as a member of the respondent's
representation team in United States v. Drayton.' Though this story may be worth
telling for its entertainment value alone, my hope is that future note writers will
draw some tips and encouragement from my experience to make their note writing
process more enjoyable and their work more valuable.
Parts II and III discuss the constitutional future of bus sweeps in the wake of
the Supreme Court's Drayton decision with an eye toward aiding future defen-
dants in preparing their motions to suppress. Part II examines various situations
in which a consent search may take place and draws from the reasoning in these
cases to argue that in the significant subset of bus sweeps which delay the departure
of a bus before contraband is discovered, the interdicting officers impermissibly
"seize" all of the passengers for Fourth Amendment purposes. In such cases, the
analysis presented in this Part urges defense attorneys to establish the delay at
trial and outlines Supreme Court precedent for considering the delay to be a Fourth
Amendment violation. The analysis presented in this Part may be exportable to
consent searches in open areas.
Part Ill explains why it may appear in suppression hearings that drug-carrying
passengers voluntarily consent to a search they know will reveal illegal narcotics.
This Part applies two quirks of human perception to on-bus police-initiated
* Law clerk, The Hon. Jackson L. Kiser, United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia. I thank Virginia Cope, Susan Herman, Taylor Reveley, and Gwen Spivey
for their helpful comments.
536 U.S. 194 (2002).
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encounters that question traditional judgments of reasonableness in consent search
scenarios. Defendants moving to suppress evidence under state constitutional
search and seizure provisions that are interpreted to be more restrictive of law
enforcement activities than are the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the Fourth
Amendment should consider the analysis of this Part in preparing their arguments.
The Article concludes by presenting the New York model for analyzing
subconstitutional police-initiated encounters. Drawing on the analysis of Parts II
and 111, the Conclusion argues that the New York approach of applying common
law principles to consent searches provides a sensible framework which demands
that police have a "founded suspicion" that criminality is afoot before engaging
in intrusive questioning of citizens. This quantum of suspicion is somewhat lower
than the reasonable suspicion police need to stop and frisk a citizen. The balance
struck by New York courts promotes individual autonomy while sacrificing little
in the way of law enforcement.
I. A LAW STUDENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. Bus Sweep Background
Bus sweeps are a drug interdiction tactic used by federal and local police
authorities in scores of cities across the United States.2 Bus sweeps developed
in the early 1980s as part of President Reagan's proclaimed "war on drugs"3 and
today bus sweeps everywhere follow essentially the same script.4 Officers mount
intercity buses at stopover bus depots and ask passengers for permission to search
their carry-on luggage and to conduct pat-down frisks of passengers in order to find
drugs or other contraband.
According to the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, police can ask bus
passengers' permission to frisk them or search their belongings. 5 The police can do
this randomly or on a mere hunch, and passengers are free to refuse permission
2 A sample of reported cases from the summer of this writing show bus sweeps in several
areas of the country. See, e.g., United States v. Winborn, 344 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Fulani, 277 F. Supp. 2d 454 (M.D. Pa. 2003); Islam v. State, No.
12-02-001172-CR, 2003 WL 21771752 (Tex. App. 2003); State v. Saluki, 580 S.E.2d 430
(N.C. App. 2003).
' See President's Radio Address, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1249, 1250 (Oct. 2,
1982) ("Drugs are bad, and we're going after them.... [W]e've taken down the surrender
flag and run up the battle flag. And we're going to win the war on drugs.").
' Dennis J. Callahan, Note, The Long Distance Remand: Florida v. Bostick and the Re-
Awakened Bus Search Battlefront in the War on Drugs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 365,
396-97 & n.156 (2001).
' Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991).
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without fear of further official scrutiny.6 As long as the encounter is considered
consensual and the permission to search voluntarily granted, the search does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.7 Any contraband that the police find during a
consensual encounter will be admissible against the passenger in court, and drugs
are often the only hard evidence against such passengers. People found trans-
porting illegal drugs for sale routinely receive prison sentences of ten to twenty
years.'
If, however, a court determines that the police behavior on the bus was so
authoritative that a reasonable person would not have felt free to ignore the police
officer,9 or if the court finds the police behavior to have been so imperious that
the passenger's consent to search was not voluntary, but rather was the product
of police coercion, the search will be deemed unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.' ° The remedy for an unconstitutional search is that the discovered
contraband will be excluded from the evidence at trial." Without evidence of the
drugs, a prosecutor will not be able to make the case, and will likely drop the
charges.
Police catch hundreds of drug couriers during bus sweeps each year, and courts
have generally found the encounters were consensual and that the permissions
6 INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216-17 (1984) ("[If the person refuses to answer and
the police take additional steps ... to obtain an answer, then the Fourth Amendment imposes
some minimal level of objective justification to validate the detention or seizure."). As with
many facets of bus sweeps and consent searches generally, the law on the books likely differs
greatly from that practiced in police-citizen encounters. For instance, it is difficult to imagine
that an officer whose suspicion is aroused by the rare person who refuses a search request
will simply drop the matter without attempting to satisfy that suspicion in some way. See,
e.g., United States v. Cothran, 729 F. Supp. 153, 156 (D.D.C. 1990) (noting a drug
interdiction officer's testimony that he "might be suspicious" of a passenger who refused a
search request and that he would notify police at the next bus depot that he suspected the
passenger of transporting drugs).
7 Consent acts as a waiver of one's Fourth Amendment right to be free from official
searches not supported by probable cause. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235
(1972) (holding that knowledge of a right to withhold consent need not be proven to show
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 651 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002)
(noting a 151 month prison sentence imposed on a drug courier); State v. Saluki, 580 S.E.2d
430 (N.C. App. 2003) (175-219-month sentence). Depending on one's criminal history, a
drug courier caught with 50-150 grams of crack cocaine - a small handful - faces a prison
sentence of 121-262 months. See U.S. SENTENCING GUiDELNES MANUAL §2D 1.1 (c) (Drug
Quantity Table) (2003).
' Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435 (applying the "free to leave" principle of Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988), to police-citizen encounters on buses).
'o Id. at 438 ('Consent' that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not
consent at all.").
" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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to search were voluntary. 2 The natural question is, Why would a drug courier
consent to a search he knows will reveal drugs and lead to a lengthy prison
sentence? 3 Of course, drug couriers always claim that the police forced the search
on them and that discovery of the drugs was therefore the product of illegal
coercion and, of course, the officers on the witness stand counter that they were
the proverbial "Officer Friendly" during any given bus sweep, thus indicating
that the encounter was consensual and the passenger's consent voluntary. 4
In 1991, the Supreme Court in Florida v. Bostick, 5 instructed lower courts
to apply a "totality of the circumstances test" in determining whether the facts of
a given case indicate that a permissible consensual encounter occurred, or whether
the police conduct was such that a reasonable passenger would have felt pressured
to comply with the requests.' 6 That these sweeps take place in the cramped confines
of a bus is one factor among many weighing into the totality of the circumstances
analysis. Others include the number, location, and dress of the officers; whether
police displayed their guns; whether they used commanding language or an
authoritative tone of voice; and whether the police informed passengers of their
right to refuse consent.'7
12 See, e.g., United States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1991) (reporting
three to four arrests per month at the Buffalo, New York bus terminal); Quarles v. State, 696
A.2d. 1334, 1339 (Del. 1997) (noting that consent searches resulted in twelve narcotics
arrests in a year by a single officer at the Wilmington, Delaware bus depot). A quick search
of cases in the major on-line legal databases will reveal dozens of local police departments
and field offices of federal law enforcement agencies that also conduct bus sweeps.
13 Justice Thurgood Marshall posed this question during the oral argument in Florida v.
Bostick. Transcript of Oral Argument, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (No.
89-1717) ("[W]hy do dope pushers plead guilty? ... I mean, when I have got dope on me,
and I say search me, am I not pleading guilty?"). I explore this question in Part II.
" Callahan, supra note 4, at 404 n. 182 (collecting sources) (noting criticism concerning
the difference between officer demeanor on the street and on the witness stand). The inherent
difficulty in adjudicating swearing contests between drug interdicting officers and drug
carrying passengers can exasperate courts. See, e.g., United States v. Quintana-Ledezma, 758
F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991):
The Court's experience with this never-ending stream of drug
interdiction cases continues to suggest that the ability of judges to
evaluate the reliability of testimony would be greatly enhanced if
officers taped their encounters with bus and train passengers. Such an
approach might help mend the uneasy state of affairs within this Circuit
over the reliability of District Court findings and the constitutionality
of police interdiction activities.
Id. at 2.
's 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
16 Id. at 437.
17 Id.
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B. Bus Sweep Jurisprudence - Bostick (1991) to Drayton (2002)
Through most of the 1990s, lower courts applying the Supreme Court's Bostick
test almost always found on-bus police-citizen encounters consensual and the
consents to search voluntarily given.' 8 Beginning in 1998, however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied the Bostick test in a series
of three bus sweep cases and found Fourth Amendment violations in each. 9 These
'8 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 4 SEARcH AND SEauRE: ATREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§9.3(c) (3d ed. 1996); see also Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous
Prey: Whence Fourth Amendment "Seizures"?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 729, 752 (concluding
that the Bostick Court seemed to instruct lower courts "not to interfere with bus sweep
procedures"). The dip in the number of published bus sweep opinions between Bostick and
1998 may have been due in part to plea bargaining. Defendants, seeing little upside to
pressing claims of Fourth Amendment violations in the wake of Bostick, may have been more
willing to plead guilty to possessing a lesser quantity of narcotics, and thus receive a shorter
prison sentence under sentencing guidelines.
"9 The Eleventh Circuit bus sweep opinions in 1998 may have been the first thorough
application of Bostick in the federal appeals courts. It is important to note that the Supreme
Court determined that the Florida Supreme Court, in its Bostick decision, had adopted a per
se rule prohibiting all bus sweeps. The Florida Supreme Court reached this decision by
applying the Florida Constitution's search and seizure provision, which by its terms is
coextensive with the United States Supreme Court's construction of the Fourth Amendment.
See FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. 1 § 12 (amended 1982). The United States Supreme Court
remanded Bostick to the Florida Supreme Court for application of its newly articulated
standard which called for weighing all the circumstances of the bus sweep in question. Rather
than apply the Bostick standard, however, in a 4-3 decision the Florida Supreme Court
summarily denied Bostick's motion to suppress in a one-sentence opinion. Florida's
dissenting justices on remand chastised the majority, applied the standard set out by the
United States Supreme Court, and found that Bostick had been impermissibly seized. But the
chill was on - in the seven years between the Bostick decision and the Eleventh Circuit
opinions in 1998, virtually no federal courts issued thorough bus sweep opinions.
The particularly egregious bus sweep procedure used in United States v. Guapi, 144
F.3d 1393 (1 1th Cir. 1998), presented the Eleventh Circuit a clear invitation to fully apply
the Bostick standards, and to find a Fourth Amendment violation. Unlike most bus sweeps,
the drug interdiction agents in Guapi made a general announcement directing passengers to
retrieve their carry-on luggage and hold it open for inspection. Id. at 1394. Also, the officers
stood in front of the passengers and only let them off the bus after their carry-on bags were
searched for drugs. According to the court, this presented "[tihe unambiguous message that
the attention and cooperation of all passengers [was] required." Id. at 1396.
Two months later, in United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998), the
Eleventh Circuit again found that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred during a bus
sweep, but this time the interdiction seemed to follow the usual bus sweep script. The
procedure in Washington was nearly identical to that in Bostick, but differed in that the
officers in Washington did not give passengers a Miranda-like warning that they could refuse
the search request, a factor to which the Eleventh Circuit gave substantial weight. See id. at
1357. The third Eleventh Circuit case was United States v. Drayton, 231 F.3d 787 (11 th Cir.
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decisions refocused attention on bus sweep procedures and perhaps emboldened
accused drug couriers to press their Fourth Amendment defenses rather than
waive them in a plea bargain. Other federal appeals courts soon addressed the
Eleventh Circuit's bus sweep decisions in their own opinions. The Ninth Circuit
sided with the Eleventh Circuit, finding impermissible police behavior had occurred
in a rather routine bus sweep." Significantly, both circuits emphasized that the
police did not warn passengers that they had a right to refuse consent to search,
and this factor weighed heavily in the courts' decisions.
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's application of the
Bostick test, and continued to admit into evidence narcotics discovered during
routine bus sweeps, even in cases where police did not give a verbal warning.2
Such clear circuit splits are a marker the Supreme Court considers in deciding
which cases to hear.22
C. My Student Note
One of the obligations of law students who work on scholarly legal journals is
to write an article of publishable quality during their second year of law school.
These "student notes" are akin to a master's thesis and typically run 25-50 journal
pages and include 125-250 footnotes. Given the time pressures on second-year
students - for example, applying and interviewing for summer employment and
judicial clerkships, myriad journal-related duties, moot court competitions, and
2000), which explicitly followed the Washington precedent. Id. at 790.
The Eleventh Circuit's progression from Guapi to Washington to Drayton are of a piece.
Guapi's blatantly coercive facts clearly indicated that an impermissible seizure had occurred.
However, without the egregious facts of Guapi to trigger a robust examination and
application of the Bostick standard, arguably for the first time, Washington and Drayton may
have followed the pattern of validating the typical post-Bostick bus sweep procedures at issue
in those cases.
As a first detailed application of Bostick, Guapi made Washington possible. As binding
circuit precedent, Washington led directly to Drayton. See Drayton, 231 F.3d at 788 n.2
(refusing "to pass on (the] criticism, and express[ing] no view concerning" the negative
reception Washington had received in the Tenth Circuit because the court was bound by
Washington's precedent in any event); see also Glazner v. Glazner, 330 F.3d 1298, 1301
(1 th Cir. 2003) (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's "prior panel precedent rule" that later
Circuit panels must follow until overturned en banc or by the Supreme Court).
20 See United States v. Stephens, 206 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing factual
similarity to Washington).
2 See United States v. Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting
Washington as creating a per se rule that police must inform passengers of right to refuse
consent).
22 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
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course work - the note writing process is considered by many students to be the
most difficult and ill-timed graduation hurdle.
Adding to the insult of the measly two credits one earns for writing a note is
the potentially enervating fact that, regardless of how many hours one works on a
piece, in the vast majority of cases few people outside of a handful of journal
colleagues who are obligated to do so are likely ever to read the article.23 For the
most part, the scholarly effort is its own reward, but for the quarter to one-third of
journal members whose notes are chosen to be published, the achievement is a
valuable addition to their resume and the reprints provide a ready-made writing
sample.
Having long disagreed with our nation's drug policy, I decided to write on
the bus sweep circuit split.2 4 My passion for the broader context of the issue was
a great advantage in the research and writing. As I read more bus sweep opinions,
my increasing conviction that targeting "drug mules" is an absurd policy had a
sustaining effect.
In the note I explain the development of bus sweep jurisprudence from its
beginning, through Bostick, and to the circuit split. I then apply psychological
theories to standard bus sweep procedures and argue that the Eleventh and Ninth
Circuits were correct in finding bus sweeps, conducted without warning passengers
that they can ignore police or refuse to be searched, are impermissible "seizures"
23 It is probably little comfort that the largely instrumental character of academic legal
writing applies to professors as well. See Harold C. Havinghurst, Law Reviews and Legal
Education, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 22, 24 (1957) ("Whereas most periodicals are published
primarily in order that they may be read, the law reviews are published primarily in order that
they may be written.").
24 Addressing a circuit split is a common student note approach, and I think it is the best
one for several reasons.
First, circuit splits come with a built-in three-part format: (1) define the constitutional,
statutory, or administrative issue and discuss its trajectory in the courts; (2) discuss the
different views of the circuits which have created the split; and (3) analyze the split and
describe why your favored approach to the issue is the better one.
Second, circuit splits number in the hundreds (if not thousands), are easy to identify, and
save time in choosing a topic by limiting research dead-ends. Finding a circuit split in an area
of interest is not very difficult. Law professors generally will know of several circuit splits
in their subject area; the "Key Number Digest" at the front of West's Federal Reporter series
contains case synopses listed by subject area, and a fair percentage of these cases will involve
circuit splits which will be discussed in the full opinion; and the weblog "How Appealing,"
http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing, regularly discusses important circuit splits.
Third, writing about circuit splits helps keep student notes moored to legal doctrine. It
is fine to sprinkle notes with a little theory and policy, but law students generally reside at
the low end of the credibility spectrum, and a note that strays too far from legal doctrine will
be handicapped from the start. By the time the writer fully develops the issue and explains
the circuit split (a valuable pursuit in itself), the note will be several thousand words deep,
and to be proportionate in length, one's analysis in the third section will remain focused.
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under the Fourth Amendment, and that such a result is faithful to the Bostick test.
Essentially, my reasoning in the piece, which I develop by applying the findings
of several psychological studies, is that the confines of a bus are inherently
coercive and that police-citizen encounters entail a built-in power relationship that
police can subtly leverage to extract "consents" to search. I conclude that the
Eleventh Circuit was correct to presume that a consent search was the product of
impermissible coercion whenever the police conduct bus sweeps without warning
passengers that they can refuse to consent.
I was fortunate to have my note selected for publication, and when The Long
Distance Remand: Florida v. Bostick and the Re-Awakened Bus Search Battlefront
of the War on Drugs, appeared in print in October 2001, 1 duly updated my resume
and mailed a few copies to family and friends. Because there had already been a
few months' lag since my final edit and publication, by the time the October 2001
issue arrived, my note was already half out of mind.
D. The Supreme Court Decides to Decide
Aside from the rare case in which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
and acts as a trial court (such as in border disputes between states), the Court's
docket is completely discretionary - it only decides cases it chooses to hear. In
recent years the Supreme Court has decided only about eighty-five cases per year
of the 8,000-plus cases parties petition the Court to consider.25 Two of the markers
the Court uses in deciding whether to hear a case ("grant a writ of certiorari" or
simply "grant cert") are (1) to resolve a circuit split, and (2) if the federal govern-
ment is the party petitioning the Court to hear a case.26 Because a circuit split had
developed over bus sweeps and because the federal government was the appealing
(i.e., petitioning) party from the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the Drayton case had
two critical features weighing in favor of the Supreme Court granting certiorari.
An important "wild card" factor was the September 11 th backdrop which formed
the subtext of the government briefs asking the Supreme Court to hear the case.
Similar legal arguments to those regarding drug interdictions can be used to validate
consent search procedures of vaguely suspected terrorists, whether or not the
25 About 2,000 of these petitions are "paid," while the majority are in forma pauperis
petitions filed by prisoners. Still, an eight-five out of 2,000 chance of having one's case heard
by the Supreme Court is slim. See Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 2002 Year-End Report
on the Federal Judiciary, Supreme Court of the United States, at http://www.supremecourt-
us.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2002year-endreport.html (Jan. 1, 2003).
26 See The Court and Constitutional Interpretations, athttp://www.supremecourtus.gov/
about/constitutional.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
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encounters take place on buses. 27 On January 4, 2002, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Drayton and set the date of oral argument for April 16, 2002.
E. Getting Involved
I was in Alabama on January 5, 2002, when I read in the Montgomery
Advertiser that the Supreme Court would hear Drayton. I was unaware that the
government had asked the Court to hear the case back in October. I immediately
went on-line and discovered that my note was the only published scholarly work
discussing the circuit split. That morning I called my criminal procedure professor,
Paul Marcus, to ask what I could do to get involved in this case. My realistic hope
was to get my note cited in a "friend of the court" brief.28 My wildest dream was to
participate in the drafting of an amicus brief filed by a group such as the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).
Professor Marcus, who had read an early draft of my note, suggested that I
contact some of the Fourth Amendment scholars whose work I had cited. Even if
these scholars were not hired to write the amicus briefs, they would at least know
which interest groups were considering filing briefs. Upon returning to the William
& Mary campus a few days later, I boned up on my bus sweep expertise, and then
e-mailed Professor Wayne LaFave of the University of Illinois. The author of the
leading treatise on the Fourth Amendment, he also wrote a comprehensive law
review article on the 1991 Bostick decision.29 Professor LaFave reported that he
would not be working on Drayton, but he suggested that I contact Professor Tracey
Maclin of Boston University. I was very familiar with Professor Maclin's work
and I had cited three of his articles in my note. Professor Maclin responded to my
e-mail that the ACLU would probably not file an amicus brief, but that if the
organization did, he would likely write it. However, Professor Maclin had been in
contact with Ms. Gwendolyn Spivey, the Federal Public Defender in Tallahassee,
Florida, who had argued and won Drayton in the Eleventh Circuit and who would
27 Justice Kennedy had allowed the Solicitor General to extend the deadline for filing a
petition in August 2001, perhaps indicating that the government had not yet decided whether
to file one. The petition was filed on October 12, 2001. Appellant's Brief in Support of a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (No.
01-631). In explaining why the Supreme Court should hear the Drayton appeal, the Solicitor
General, whose wife was aboard one of the airplanes hijacked on 9/11, argued, "In the
current environment, [bus sweeps] may also become an important part of preventing crim-
inal... activity that involve[s] travel on the nation's system of public transportation."Id.at 22.
" These "amicus curiae briefs," or simply "amicus briefs," are legal briefs non-party
interest groups often file in Supreme Court cases. As it turned out, the one amicus brief filed
on our side cited my note. Brief for Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers at 8, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (No. 01-631).
9 See LaFave sources cited supra note 18.
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be arguing the case before the Supreme Court. Professor Maclin commented
favorably on my note (I had given him the citation in my initial e-mail), and he had
forwarded my e-mail to Ms. Spivey.30
Nothing happened for a week or so, and in that interim I approached the Cato
Institute, a libertarian think tank in Washington, D.C. which occasionally files
amicus briefs in Fourth Amendment cases. I had worked for Cato the previous
summer and I hoped I could convince my former colleagues to file a brief in
Drayton. They gave my proposal serious consideration, but ultimately decided
that the case was not a good fit for them. At this point, I had reached a dead-end
and had resigned myself simply to following the case and perhaps writing a short
law journal article on it following the Supreme Court decision.
F. First Contacts
A week or so after my exchange of e-mails with Professor Maclin, on Friday,
January 18, 2002, I received a phone call from Gwen Spivey. She had read my
detailed e-mail Professor Maclin had forwarded to her, as well as part of my note.
Ms. Spivey had some background questions on the Supreme Court's approach to
consent searches, and we talked for about two hours, during which I covered most
of the analysis in my note.
Of course, during this initial phone call I volunteered to do anything Ms. Spivey
wanted me to do on the case. I was delighted that she took me up on the offer. That
afternoon she e-mailed the two briefs she had filed in the Eleventh Circuit and the
brief she had filed in opposition to the government's petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court. Though they are public documents, federal appeals court and
certiorari briefs are not widely available, so these briefs presented my first inside
look at the case. I spent the entire weekend studying these seventy-five pages of
briefs, and I wrote Ms. Spivey a long e-mail of comments on Sunday evening. I had
no inkling that this would be the first of hundreds of e-mails we would exchange
over the next three months.
G. Early Involvement
In the e-mailed comments I sent Ms. Spivey, I asked her to send me a copy of
the trial transcripts from the case. I was quite surprised at the size of the FedEx
envelope that arrived at my door two days later - there were about 300 pages of
transcripts! Bus sweep cases can turn on minute details of how the bus sweep in
30 Though I found it awkward to do so, I found it beneficial to promote my note once it
was published. See EUGENE VOLOKH, ACADEMIC LEGAL WRITiNG: LAW REVIEw ARTICLEs,
STUDENT NoTES, AND SEMINAR PAPERS 151-53 (2003) (describing strategies to tastefully
promote one's published note).
[Vol. 13:567
A LAW STUDENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
question transpired, and the transcripts are the resource from which all the
important facts are mined. In our system of appellate review, the testimony and
facts gathered at trial remain fixed throughout the appeals process, but the legal
arguments stressed by each side based on these facts can change as the case enters
different levels in the appeals process.
Having likely read more post-Bostick bus sweep opinions than anyone else, I
knew what to look for in the suppression hearing transcript. I found it contained
many nuggets of information that would support arguments before the Supreme
Court that had not been fully developed in the Eleventh Circuit proceedings. In
addition, whereas the focus of the Eleventh Circuit's inquiry was on the voluntari-
ness of the consent to search, the Supreme Court seemed more concerned with
determining whether a seizure occurred before the officers requested permission to
search. The change in the issue in turn changed the factual focus. A few days later
I sent Ms. Spivey another long e-mail with my comments.
By this time, I was really starting to feel like I was part of the process of
preparing the argument for the Supreme Court. Gwen and I were exchanging e-
mails every day and I had participated in strategy session conference calls with the
team she had put together to help her prepare the case. The team included a few
partners from a Washington, D.C. law firm, Sidley Austin, whose pro bono work
is to help counsel for indigent defendants write their Supreme Court briefs and
otherwise prepare their cases.
Among the topics covered in these conference calls were (1) deciding what
portions of the trial transcripts we wanted included in the Joint Appendix (the
supporting documentation both parties agree should be made into a bound paper-
back book for the Justices because the Justices would not want to read the entire
300 pages of transcripts); (2) determining the rough outline of our brief (our side's
argument, capped at fifty pages; the Justices decide cases based much more on
the briefs the parties submit than the arguments counsel make during the one-hour
oral argument); and (3) creating the research plan to support the brief writing.
That I was participating in these conference calls and making arguments on
each of the topics from my increasingly paper-strewn apartment in Williamsburg
was somewhat surreal. Two weeks earlier I would have been ecstatic to help on an
amicus brief, so I could not get over the good fortune I was enjoying in becoming
part of the team representing the actual party going before the Supreme Court.
F. The Case-Poaching Nightmare
The research for our respondent's brief was going well when, on February 1 st,
Gwen received a fax from a lawyer in Chicago.31 A Mr. Koch had contacted
3' The information in this paragraph is contained in Respondent's Motion to Strike and
Objection to Attempted Substitution of Counsel, United States v. Drayton (No. 01-631)
(Feb. 2, 2002), and its supporting affidavits (on file with author).
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Drayton and had asked him to sign a retainer stating that Koch would be Drayton's
Supreme Court lawyer. Because the Supreme Court hears less than two percent of
the cases it is asked to hear, Koch's apparent modus operandi was to wait until
the Court granted certiorari in a Fourth Amendment case involving an indigent
defendant, and then to try to woo them as a client. Koch reportedly told Drayton
the suspect assertions that he would do a better job than Gwen and that he already
had nine lawyers working on the case. Gwen called other Federal Public Defenders
who had argued Fourth Amendment cases before the Supreme Court, and learned
that Koch had tried to poach some of their clients and had succeeded once.
Though it is an undeveloped area of legal ethics for the obvious reason that
lawyers do not often vie to represent indigent defendants, contacting a party who
is already represented by counsel seems to be an ethical violation only if it is done
for pecuniary gain. Koch was going to represent Drayton for free. However, when
one considers the millions of dollars lobbyists spend to gain access to politicians,
the time and money Koch would spend preparing the case for the Supreme Court
would be a small price to pay for the glory, publicity, and influence of having the
Supreme Court Justices read his 50-page brief and listen to his oral argument, and
for being able to advertise himself as a repeat Supreme Court practitioner.
Things looked bleak for our side for a couple of weeks. As disappointed as I
was by the prospect of no longer being involved in the case, I felt worse for Gwen.
Though she attended Harvard Law School, had been a top appellate advocate for
twenty years, and had argued in the Eleventh Circuit over thirty times, this was
her first Supreme Court case. Gwen was not about to go down without a fight,
however. She collected the information about Koch's questionable, if perhaps not
technically unethical, method of operation. Gwen then filed a "Motion to Strike
and Objection to Attempted Substitution of Counsel" with the Supreme Court.
Koch filed a reply motion defending his actions. This episode was reported in the
legal newspapers and one commentator called it the "most rancorous dispute
between lawyers brought to the Court's attention in decades."3 We were in
limbo for a few weeks before the Supreme Court decided who would represent
Mr. Drayton. In the meantime, we kept researching, but it was not with the same
energy as before. If the motion to strike were not granted, all our work would be
for naught.
In mid-February, Gwen received an entirely unexpected call from Drayton
saying that he had wanted Gwen to be his lawyer all along. On March 4, 2002, the
Supreme Court made it official by granting the motion to strike. We had lost a lot
of time, but we were back on the case!
32 Tony Mauro, Lawyers Spar for Control of Case: High Court to Decide Who'll Handle
Argument, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 4, 2002, at 1.
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G. The Merits Brief
The merits briefs are the parties' main opportunity to persuade the Supreme
Court Justices. The Government's brief was filed on February 19th, and our
Respondent's brief was due March 21st. Due to the case-poaching crisis we had
fallen behind our writing schedule and had to pick up the pace. Throughout
February Gwen and I had been exchanging about one e-mail per day, but after the
motion to strike was granted our e-mail traffic increased to about five per day and
would stay at about that level until our brief was submitted.
I had been working on an argument for the brief to the effect that any delay of
a bus's departure caused by drug interdiction officers conducting consent searches
constitutes impermissible Fourth Amendment seizures of all the passengers.33
This was not the main issue below and such an argument had never been addressed
directly by a federal appeals court. Also, the trial record strongly suggested, but did
not conclusively establish, that the bus on which Drayton was traveling had in fact
been delayed by the officers. Just the same, I thought the argument was valid and
merited consideration for inclusion in the brief. I submitted a detailed memo of
the argument to Gwen on March 6, 2002. Gwen, the Sidley Austin lawyers, and I
debated several times whether to include this argument in the brief. Ultimately,
because of the weak foundation of the argument (its novelty and the holes in the
trial record on the point), we decided that little of my eight-page single-spaced
"delay equals seizure" argument would make it into the brief. In the final version
this argument shrunk to two paragraphs and a footnote, though of course I did not
know then that even this much of my memo would survive the final cut.
34
Continuing my incredible run of good fortune, my spring break was the ten
days leading up to our internal deadline of March 10th for completing a full first
draft of our brief. I had e-mailed Gwen an outline of how I thought we should
present our legal argument, and I offered to take the first crack at it. Her reply that
I should feel free to "go for it" was all the encouragement I needed. My spring
break was an exciting and surreal time. By this time I had created walking paths
through the sea of documents that covered my apartment floor. Though I have
never worked longer and harder in my life, drafting the legal argument for the brief
was indescribably exhilarating. From 8 a.m. to 2 a.m., almost non-stop, I honed
" Under Supreme Court precedent, in order to detain a citizen (by force or by the
citizen's submission to lawful authority), police need at least a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the suspect is carrying contraband. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968).
Because bus sweep consent searches are conducted absent any such particularized suspicion,
I reasoned Supreme Court precedent indicates that officers whose bus sweeps delay the bus's
departure necessarily seize all the passengers in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
3 I still believe "delay equals seizure" is a winning argument if the crucial facts are
established at trial. See infra Part II.
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my research, wrote, edited, and re-edited the brief according to the outline I had
presented to Gwen the week before. On the Sunday night ending my spring break,
I was still a tan-less, pasty-faced grad student, but I had e-mailed my ten-page,
single-spaced draft of the legal analysis to Gwen.
While I worked on my submission, Gwen wrote the statement of the facts. She
then edited and combined the sections the Sidley Austin lawyers and I had written,
and wrote transitions linking the sections to create a logical narrative flow. Gwen
was to e-mail the entire draft to the group by March 13th. I expected that, like my
"delay equals seizure" section, little of my submission would make it into the
final product, but I hoped that the occasional paragraph would survive. I was
stunned - though guardedly confident of my analysis - when I saw that the draft
Gwen circulated to the group included virtually my entire submission. I knew that
at this late date, there was not enough time to substantially rework the legal
analysis from scratch and that much of the final brief would therefore have been
written on my computer in Williamsburg. When the editing was completed and the
brief submitted on March 21, 2002, I had written about twenty of its forty-five
pages and most of the legal analysis.
H. Oral Argument Preparation
Some Supreme Court watchers consider the oral arguments to be mere
spectacle. I think this view is too harsh. It is more likely that one can lose a close
case, but not win a losing one, during oral argument, and that a great oral argument
coupled with a weak performance by the other side can sway a Justice who is on
the fence to your side of an issue.
Once the brief was finalized, I suffered a bit of "postpartum depression."
Though my studies certainly could have used some attention, I found it very
difficult to concentrate on them for any length of time before my thoughts turned
to bus sweeps. My emotional letdown was not long-lived because Gwen soon
began e-mailing me with questions and topics of discussion to help her prepare for
the oral argument on April 16th. Gwen's big day was a Tuesday, and she had
scheduled preparatory moot courts at Sidley Austin and at Georgetown Law
Center in Washington, D.C. on the Thursday and Friday before the oral argument.
Gwen asked me to attend the moot courts and of course I was very happy to
oblige. After dozens of phone calls and hundreds of e-mails, Gwen and I finally
met each other at the Thursday moot court at Sidley Austin.
I could tell immediately that Gwen is a superb oral advocate. Her thirty-plus
trips before the Eleventh Circuit were on display as she skillfully responded to the
questions posed by the moot court panel two beats faster than I could even think
of a decent answer. A few months before I had been the bus search expert, but
Gwen was a quick study and had every relevant case nailed. Gwen clearly enjoys
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appellate oral advocacy, and I realized at that first moot court that she and I made
a great team because I am happy to research and write, leaving the courtroom
advocacy to others.
Gwen called me in Williamsburg on Saturday, April 13th to talk through a few
points, and she asked if I could drive up on Sunday in order to help her prepare on
Monday, the day before the argument. I did not know what to expect that day, but
I assumed she would have a group of experts with us for the homestretch. As it
turned out, we were indeed performing without a net. She and I spent about ten
hours together that day and there were no last-minute "ringers" brought in. She
practiced getting her main points in as I, in the role of a Supreme Court Justice,
asked her questions intended to throw her off-script; and we analyzed hypothetical
situations we thought the Justices might pose the next morning. Gwen was
thoroughly prepared for her big day and was clearly "peaking" for the argument.
L The Oral Argument
The seating area of the Court is surprisingly small, but the courtroom is
impressive in its stateliness. Gwen's family, who I had met the day before, and I
talked nervously as Gwen chatted with her co-counsel and opposing counsel, and
she came back to our seats a couple of times to talk. The room fell silent a few
minutes before 10 a.m. - the scheduled time of the oral argument - and soon "All
Rise" was called out. The Court addressed two matters before the oral argument.
Former Justice Byron White had died the day before, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
began the day with some remarks about his former colleague. Next, the Court
handed down a much-anticipated First Amendment decision, and Justice Kennedy
took the unusual step of discussing the majority opinion he authored for several
minutes. After these preludes, Chief Justice Rehnquist called for argument in
United States v. Drayton to begin.
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson (second in the Department of
Justice hierarchy behind Attorney General John Ashcroft) was arguing the case
for the Government, and as counsel for the petitioning party, he argued first. A
polished speaker, he tried to focus on the policy arguments for overturning the
Eleventh Circuit's decision. The Justices - particularly Justices Souter and
Stevens - asked Mr. Thompson some tough questions, and a couple of the Justices
seemed a bit incredulous and exasperated with some of his answers.
Fourth Amendment cases typically create a "hot bench," and by the time
Gwen stepped to the podium the Justices were warmed up. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Kennedy asked the most pointed questions, many of which
centered on the importance of the lack of warnings and the degree to which the
Court can expect citizens to assert their constitutional rights in a consent search
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situation.35 Just as she had in the moot courts, Gwen had sharp, quick answers
for each question, and at one point she achieved the seeming impossibility of
silencing Justice Scalia. When he made a factual error, Gwen politely but
humorously pointed it out.36 A highlight for me occurred when Justice Kennedy
held up respondent's brief and read from a section I had written, some of the terms
of which originated in my student note.37
I met Gwen in the lobby outside the Court with well-deserved congratulations
and we proceeded down the impressive granite steps facing the Capitol Building.
Gwen had done a great job at oral argument, and I was honored to be a part of it.
J. Drayton Decided
The story goes that Justice Brennan used to start every course he taught by
asking, "What is the first rule of the Supreme Court? You have to get five."3 The
Supreme Court decided Drayton on June 17, 2002, and if Justices merely vote
rather than explain, then we lost 6-3. For several reasons, I did not expect to win,39
" The theory undergirding these questions is that the Constitution is invigorated when
citizens learn and invoke their rights (here to refuse a search request), but weakened when
the Court creates prophylactic rules to give effect to constitutional provisions, thereby
creating a disincentive for citizens to know and assert their rights. See Oral Argument
Transcript at 44, United States v. Drayton, 2002 WL 1305729 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2002) (No.
01-631) [hereinafter Oral Transcript] (Question by Justice Kennedy) ("It - it seems to me
this world you're creating for us [by advocating that a Miranda-like warnings requirement
is necessary to validate bus sweeps] is - is not strong for the Constitution. It seems to me
a strong world is when officers respect people's rights and - and people know what their
rights are and - and assert their rights.").
36 This rare event was noted by Supreme Court beat reporters. See, e.g., Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Hear Arguments on Searches of Buses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at
A19.
37 See Oral Transcript, supra note 35, at 43-44.
3' Hon. Abner Mikva, What Justice Brennan Gave Us to Keep, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 655,
656 (1999).
31 I had feared a rout was a greater possibility than winning five votes. First, although I
think the Eleventh Circuit decided Washington and Drayton correctly as a matter of policy,
under the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court and most post-Bostick
bus sweep cases, the two Eleventh Circuit decisions were doctrinal outliers. Second, in
"counting Justices," it was extremely difficult to get to Justice Brennan's "magic number"
of five votes. Justice O'Connor, often the swing vote between the conservative and the
moderate Justices, wrote the majority opinion in Bostick and would not likely distinguish
Drayton from her earlier decision. Also, Justice Breyer, usually a more moderate Justice,
tends to side with the more conservative Justices in Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Bd.
of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 832 (2002) (5-4 decision) (Justice Breyer in the majority holding
that high school drug testing policy did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (6-3 decision) (Justice Breyer in the majority holding that
probable cause to search an automobile extends to a passenger's personal belongings capable
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but I was still disappointed. There are a few aspects of the majority opinion with
which I agree, and I suppose I should be thankful that it was not a rout. The
approach taken by both the Drayton majority and the dissent validates the approach
we took in the brief in that both opinions are heavily fact-dependent. The Justices
in the majority simply seem to have been more disposed to stress facts favoring a
law-and-order outcome than those facts supportive of individual liberties.
Thankfully, the majority opinion did not stretch consent search law too much
in Drayton, and as a result the majority's reasoning likely will not be exported to
future cases. The previously established rule that police need not inform citizens
of their Fourth Amendment rights in open areas' and during vehicle stops4 now
explicitly applies to bus searches, too.
Neither opinion in Drayton mentioned the most heinous result urged by the
Government. In the Government's brief, the Solicitor General had tried to shoe-
horn into general consent search precedent an ill-fitting defective warrant case
from thirty years earlier. In United States v. Watson,42 the consent of the person
arrested under an invalid warrant was upheld despite the fact that the consent
was given while the citizen was under arrest.4 3 Citing Watson, the Solicitor General
argued that even if Drayton were considered "seized," he could nonetheless grant
valid consent to search his person.' If the Supreme Court had adopted such a
of concealing contraband). Third, due in large part to its discretionary docket, the Supreme
Court has a tendency to "correct" mistakes by lower courts, and reverses about three-quarters
of the decisions it reviews. See Lower Court Reversal Rates for Cases Producing Slip
Opinions: Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 2002, at http://www.center-
forindividualfreedom.org/legal/reversal rates.pdf (last visited, Sept. 20, 2004) (indicating
that the Court reversed or remanded in fifty-nine of eighty cases, or seventy-four percent that
Term). Fourth, the Government applied for certiorari in Drayton only a month after the
September 11,2001 terrorist attacks, and Drayton was the first civil liberties-related case that
the Solicitor General asked the Court to hear. Historically, there has been an interplay
between the degree to which American society has viewed itself as threatened domestically
and the interpretive breadth granted constitutional civil liberties by the judiciary. Writing as
an academic historian, Chief Justice Rehnquist has acknowledged "the role of public opinion
in balancing, on the one hand, accepted principles of civil liberties drawn from somewhat
ethereal constitutional provisions in peacetime with, on the other hand, the encroachment on
those principles in times perceived as more dangerous." Dennis J. Callahan, Book Review,
49 FED. LAW 65, 67 (May 2002) (reviewing WLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT
ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998)). In Fall 2001 and Spring 2002, the scales of
public opinion tipped toward encroachment on civil liberties principles. See Kenneth W.
Starr, Editorial, The Anthrax Term, WAIL ST. J., July 5, 2002, at A12 (discussing Drayton
as one of the Solicitor General's "unbroken string of victories" in Fourth Amendment cases).
0 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973).
41 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996).
42 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
43 See id. at 424.
"4 Brief for United States at 32 n.5, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
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rule, police could physically detain random citizens on the street and ask for
their consent to a search. According to the Soliciter General's argument, if the
citizen consented to a search after being detained, the search would be considered
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Souter's dissent was just the type of opinion we hoped four Justices
would join. The dissenting Justices read the interaction as I strongly suspect it
transpired - police subtly (or not so subtly) coercing passengers to elicit
"consents" to search and later giving lopsided, self-serving testimony concerning
the interaction. The New York Times and other major metropolitan newspapers
ran editorials condemning the majority decision for this reason.45 Justice Souter's
opinion and the media response give reason to hope that a Supreme Court fifteen,
twenty, or thirty years from now will adopt the dissent's more realistic view of
police-citizen interactions. 6
I am also a bit gratified at the dissent's use of psychology. Justice Souter
similarly applied many of the same psychological concepts used in my Note -
such as the bus driver ceding authority to police,47 the officers' coercive use of
space,48 and the applicability of speech act theory to bus sweeps (i.e., that a
Tellingly, the Solicitor General did not ask the Court to apply the "attenuation exception" to
the exclusionary rule in which "the product of illegal police conduct may be admitted if it has
become so distanced from the underlying illegal police conduct as to dissipate the taint of the
illegal search or seizure." United States v. Goodrich, 183 F. Supp. 2d 135, 145 (D. Mass.
2001) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). None of the three
factors - temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and the purpose of the official's
misconduct - used to determine whether a suspect's consent was so attenuated as to break
the causal chain were present in Drayton's case. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04
(1975). First, if a seizure had taken place, very little time elapsed between the seizure and the
subsequent consent request. Second, there were no intervening circumstances to purge the
taint of the illegal seizure, such as a warning. Third, the purpose of the interdicting officers
was to elicit consents to search, so discovering the narcotics could not have been inadvertent.
4' Editorial, Civil Rights on a Greyhound, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at A22; Richard
Pretorius, Editorial, A Bus for Justice Kennedy, WASH. POST, June 22, 2002, at A19.
46 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOcIETIES NEED DISSENT 71 (2003) (noting that Supreme
Court dissents have become law over 130 times and observing that dissenting opinions "give
a signal to posterity, and also a stock of reasons for coming out the other way").
" Compare United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 211 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("[T]he driver... had yielded the custody of the bus and its seated passengers to three police
officers"), with Callahan, supra note 4, at 410 & n.217 (applying Professor Stanley
Milgram's obedience to authority experiments to situations in which "the bus driver
disembarked before the bus sweep commenced, leaving the officers without a competing
authority figure and focusing passengers' natural obedience to authority onto the agents").
48 Compare Drayton, 536 U.S. at 209-11 (Souter, J., dissenting) (likening the interdicting
officers' use of the confines of a bus to a situation in which three officers surround a citizen
in an alley in order to leverage consent to search), with Callahan, supra note 4, at 399-402
(subheading "Coercion, Confines, and Consent").
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passenger would understand an interrogative search request from a police officer
as a demand)49 - that were included in our Respondent's Brief °
It was a fun ride, the fight was a just one, and although we lost, I think our
arguments limited the damage that could have been done in this case. Further,
our arguments may serve as a foundation for the Supreme Court to decide the
issue differently in future consent search cases.
K. Lasting Impressions
On the steps of the Supreme Court immediately following the oral argument,
Gwen gave me one of the two quill pens that are given as souvenirs to each
advocate who argues before the Supreme Court. I was truly touched by this
gesture, and it is a perfect symbol for the memories and lessons from the experi-
ence I hold dear. The first lesson of this experience is humility. Gwen did not have
to champion my involvement on the case - she could have done a fine job writing
the brief on her own or she could have recruited a renowned Fourth Amendment
scholar. However, Gwen welcomed my input at every turn. Though I was not a
lawyer yet, she treated me as a colleague.
Second is equality of opportunity. Whether due to elitism or simply the
handiness of proxies when one is under time pressure, I think lawyers can tend
to consider the source of an opinion to be more important than the logic of the
opinion itself. Gwen ignored the proxies and trusted her own judgment by
weighing my input on its merit. That I was a student did not matter to her.
The third lesson is the importance of luck. So many events had to fall in place
for me to have the level of involvement on the case I enjoyed - the timing of the
publication of my Note and the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari were perfect,
someone as humble and open-minded as Gwen had to be arguing Drayton, and
no renowned Fourth Amendment scholar stepped forward to help write the brief.
I realize that I was extremely fortunate and that many attorneys, law professors,
and law students put themselves in a similar position by knowing one small area
of the law very well, but never get to work on a Supreme Court case. I hit the
lottery my first try.
The last and strongest memory and lesson concerns collegiality and friendship.
Of course, working on the brief and helping to prepare any attorney for a Supreme
"9 Compare Drayton, 536 U.S. at 212 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Later requests to search
prefaced with 'Do you mind...' would naturally have been understood in the terms with which
the encounter began."), with Callahan, supra note 4, at 402-07 (discussing the disconnect
between the text of bus sweep officers' "requests" to search and the contexts in which the
"requests" are made).
5 See Brief for Respondents at 35-36, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002)
(No. 01-631) (obedience to authority); id. at 27, 33 (officers' coercive use of space); id. at
42-43 & n.34 (speech acts).
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Court argument would have been a thrill. But the working relationship and
friendship Gwen and I built made the experience thoroughly enjoyable. I think
that is why I was not really sad after the oral argument - my involvement in this
case may be over, but I have gained a trusted colleague and friend with whom I
hope to collaborate again.
II. SUSPICIONLESS DELAYS AS IMPERMISSIBLE SEIZURES
The Drayton majority so cabined the reach of Fourth Amendment protections
in bus sweep cases that in federal courts applying Drayton, and in state courts
which hold their states' constitutional search and seizure protections to be coexten-
sive with the Fourth Amendment,5' little room remains to argue that a defendant's
motion to suppress should be granted in a case arising from a paradigmatic bus
sweep. However, this Part illustrates that under recent Supreme Court precedent,
and consistent with Drayton, in the significant subset of bus sweeps that extend
past the scheduled departure of the bus before the police discover contraband, the
officer-induced delay, however brief, effects an impermissible seizure of all
passengers, thereby invoking the exclusionary rule. In many bus sweep cases, likely
including the one in Drayton, such police-induced delay of the bus's departure in
fact occurs, but is not conclusively established at trial. This Part also argues that
the same rubric should be exported to initial police-citizen encounters made as part
of consent searches conducted in open areas, thus limiting law enforcement's
ability to accost citizens at will for the purpose of searching them.
Unlike its earlier bus sweep decision in Florida v. Bostick, which reversed
and remanded the case back to the lower court to apply the articulated standard,5
2
on very similar facts the majority in Drayton concluded that the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.53 Although the Court's decision
that, as a matter of law, Drayton was neither seized by police during the initial
encounter nor coerced into consenting to a search seems out of touch with the dyna-
mics of police-citizen encounters,54 the majority's clarity regarding the two-stage
51 See Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal Procedure: State
Constitutional Law and Selective Disincorporation, 87 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 63,
92 (1996) (calculating that "47 of the 50 states have established or enlarged federal search
and seizure rights on state constitutional grounds").
52 501 U.S. 429,437 (1991) (finding insufficient findings of fact necessary to apply the
correct legal standard).
3 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203, 206.
u See id. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting) (commenting that the majority's opinion showed
"little sign" of the common understanding that police "may overbear a normal person's abil-
ity to act freely"); Charles Lane, Transcript, Supreme Court: The New Term, WASH. POST,
Oct. 17, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynfarticles/A30364-20030ct15.html
(citing Drayton as an example of the Court's "certain lack of a common person's perspective").
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approach should be taken by subsequent courts as welcome guidance." Whereas
the Bostick majority had been somewhat unclear on the two-step approach courts
should take in analyzing bus sweeps,56 the Drayton majority analyzed first the
initial police-citizen encounter to determine whether Drayton was "seized" in
violation of the Fourth Amendment57 before turning to the second prong of the
analysis, whether Drayton's consent to search was given voluntarily.5"
The Court's seriatim approach of analyzing the initial police-citizen encounter
before addressing the search request reflects a more explicit embrace of the
forerunner of consent search jurisprudence, Terry v. Ohio's reasonable suspicion
analysis. 9 The Drayton majority's refocusing of Terry's principles, by separating
the analysis of the initial encounter from that of the subsequent search request,
offers courts a more complete methodology for understanding the police-citizen
dynamic at play in a consent search scenario.' This Part analyzes officers' initial
encounters with citizens involving passenger vehicles and intercity buses for
the purpose of conducting consent searches to uncover evidence of criminal
wrongdoing. In order to reanimate Terry's principle that, at a minimum, a police
" This Part urges a closer examination of initial police-citizen encounters within the
Court's precedent, and thus avoids the trap of simply bashing the majority opinion in
Drayton. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 87 (1995) ("The law reviews reek of
the smell of cordite from the salvos with which today's law professors bombard today's
Supreme Court Justices.").
56 The question the Florida Supreme Court was to answer on remand was "whether
Bostick chose to permit the search of his luggage." See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438. This
question obscures the two-pronged analysis necessary in consent search cases, risking a
conflation of the analyses of the approach (i.e., the seizure question) and the search (i.e., the
voluntariness of the consent question) into a nebulous "sense of the encounter" question. See
Callahan, supra note 4, at 377-80.
51 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-05.
58 Id. at 206 ("We turn now from the question whether respondents were seized to
whether they were subjected to an unreasonable search, i.e., whether their consent to the
suspicionless search was involuntary."). The Court then noted that "[iun circumstances such
as these, where the question of voluntariness pervades both the search and seizure inquiries,
the respective analyses turn on very similar facts." Id. In this assessment, the Court was not
entirely faithful to its precedents, as the voluntariness of a consent to search considers the
subjective characteristics of the defendant, such as his age, education level, and whether he
knew that he had a constitutional right to refuse the request. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 226 (1973); see Drayton, 536 U.S. at 208-09 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting).
" Under Terry, a reviewing court analyzes first whether the police had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion to stop a suspect before determining whether the scope of the frisk
remained within allowable bounds. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968).
6 However, the Terry framework remains a poor fit for analyzing police-initiated
searches based on consent, because Terry effectively relegates a wide variety of encounters
into one undifferentiated subconstitutional mass. This problem is addressed in the
Conclusion. See infra notes 196-209 and accompanying text.
2004]
WILLIAM & MARY BiLL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
stop of a citizen must be based on the officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal
behavior, any police action at the initial encounter stage of an attempted consent
search that delays a citizen should be considered an impermissible seizure under
the Fourth Amendment, thus triggering the suppression of evidence so discovered.
This is the case regarding vehicle stops and bus-delaying interdiction procedures,
and these holdings should inform the trickier case of consent searches which take
place in open areas, such as parking lots and sidewalks.
A. The Terry Standard for Police Stops of Citizens
A traveler "who has given no good cause for believing he is engaged in
[illegal] activity is entitled to proceed on his way without interference."'" When
articulated by the Supreme Court, this principle applied to anyone for whom the
police did not have probable cause to detain, and is best characterized as a "right
to locomotion."62 This right is vitiated when police are granted unfettered license
to inquire into a citizen's routine conduct absent any investigatory purpose,63 a
power police did not have for the Fourth Amendment's first 170 years." Given
the widespread use of consent searches today, 65 it is easy to forget that only a
generation ago police needed probable cause to accost citizens for the purpose of
uncovering possible criminal wrongdoing, and that the lowering of the threshold
6 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949); see also Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (declaring that a foundational
premise of the Fourth Amendment is that Americans enjoy "the right to be let alone," free
from government interference).
62 See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment
on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 passim (1990).
3 See id. at 1266 (questioning the existence of a common law "right-to-inquire rule,
[under which] law enforcement officers are free to inquire about the public comings and
goings of individuals"). Professor Maclin concludes that prior to Terry, "a majority of the
Court... remained committed to the view that citizens' fundamental right of free movement
cannot be interrupted unless there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed."
Id. at 1268.
6' The pre-Terry minority position was that an aspect of a police officer's duty was to
"accost" (in the sense of "approach and speak to... without having first been spoken to")
and question citizens. Id. at 1268, 1264 n.23 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 12 (Unabridged ed. 1981)). Since Terry, the Court has implicitly reversed itself
so that the power of police to accost citizens goes virtually unquestioned in consent search
cases.
65 RICHARD VAN DuIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS,
PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 19 (1985) (noting that consent searches comprise up to ninety-eight
percent of all police searches).
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to reasonable suspicion in Terry was a very contentious decision66 that continues
to draw condemnation.67
By its terms, Terry empowers police to seize6' and frisk persons who they
reasonably and articulably believe may be contemplating criminal acts and who
may be armed, thereby posing a danger to the police.69 This "bright line" view of
Terry is tolerable. However, Terry's departure from the probable cause standard
for detaining a citizen served as a wedge for the Supreme Court's reexamination of
police-citizen encounters when suspicion is absent, and Terry now forms the crest
of a slippery slope in which the formerly restrained right of officers to inquire
6 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explicitly
conditioning the officer's right "to interrupt Terry's freedom of movement and invade his
privacy... only because circumstances warranted forcing an encounter with Terry in an
effort to prevent or investigate a crime"); id. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (decrying the
abandonment of the probable cause standard as "a long step down the totalitarian path").
67 See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron,
Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40passim (1969); Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering,
the Court, and Some Realism about Police Patrol, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 177-78 ("Terry
v. Ohio... may be the Court's single most important Fourth Amendment case in terms of its
role in constituting a legal environment broadly supportive of the street-level discretion of
officers on patrol."). Some have countered these criticisms by arguing that Terry has been
interpreted too broadly by its critics. See, e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, The Warren
Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A Law Clerk's Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.J. 891, 895
(1998) (arguing that Terry addressed only the power to frisk and "did not necessarily involve
approval of the much more amorphous and troublesome power to 'detain' a person for
purposes of investigation on less than probable cause to arrest").
68 The concept of actual, physical detention or submission to an assertion of legal
authority having that effect has become the bright line defining seizures triggering Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 ("Only when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may
we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,
626 (1991) ("An arrest requires either physical force... or, where that is absent, submission
to the assertion of authority.").
69 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 (empowering an officer without probable cause to take
necessary action when the officer believes that the individual whose suspicious behavior he
is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others).
Interestingly, the Brinegar Court had disavowed lowering the quantum of proof needed to
support a stop nineteen years earlier. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949)
(reaffirming the probable cause standard and noting that drivers may not be "stopped and
searched at the officers' whim, caprice or mere suspicion"). Much like the drug interdiction
roadblock detentions at issue in Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2002), discussed
below, the police tactic eschewed in this portion of Brinegar involved suspicionless vehicle
stops of potential bootleg liquor runners. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 177 n.17 ("It would be
intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile
on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to
the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.") (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925)).
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into the activities of citizens has been removed from the purview of Fourth
Amendment scrutiny.7"
By definition, initial police-citizen encounters in consent searches are not
supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Comparing bus sweeps to
these unsupported stops highlights that an illegal seizure occurs whenever a
sweep delays a bus's departure, no matter how briefly.7' Subpart 1 below explores
the impermissible seizures which occur when vehicles are stopped absent probable
cause, and then likens traffic stops which extend past their justified duration to
departure-delaying bus sweeps. This Subpart then compares pretextual vehicle
stops to their consent search analog - police selectively choosing (or "profiling")
the targets of their consent search efforts. Whereas pretextual vehicle stops are
nonetheless constitutional because supported by probable cause, that police can
selectively target citizens for consent searches suggests that initial police-citizen
encounters involve a citizen's submission to authority, not merely a citizen's
willing engagement with the officer, and thus may violate the Fourth Amendment.
The roadblock cases discussed in Subpart 2 hone the analysis. These temporary
seizures made absent reasonable suspicion are allowed only for particular purposes.
The Court's purposes-based balancing test for roadblocks supports the argument
"0 Maclin, supra note 62, at 1272-77 (tracing how the progression from Terry and United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), which created the "free to leave" principle later
transformed into a "free to ignore" principle in Bostick, and their progeny "moved the right-
to-inquire entirely out of fourth amendment scrutiny"). The Supreme Court's increasingly
myopic view of the Fourth Amendment over the thirty-five years, precipitated by Terry's
abandonment of the probable cause standard, continued with its determination in Drayton
that as a matter of law a reasonable bus passenger would have felt free to disregard the three
officers surrounding and peppering him with questions. Cf Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms
of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1026, 1112 (2003) (describing how legal rules
"vague at the margins" get stretched over a series of opinions by successive appellate panels
due to "small change tolerance slippery slopes").
Bostick's "free to ignore" principle is most clearly isolated in baggage abandonment
cases. The analysis parallels that of consent searches, only here courts examine whether a
passenger's disavowal of ownership of their bag found to contain contraband was voluntary,
or rather, was the product of duress or coercion. United States v. Austin, 66 F.3d 1115, 1118
(10th Cir. 1995). In United States v. Fulani, 277 F. Supp. 2d 454 (M.D. Pa. 2003), a
passenger did not respond to an officer's request to search the bag or cooperate in any way
with the agent. Id. at 456. The officer searched the bag, which was tagged with the
passenger's identification. Id. The court found the search impermissible because police could
not infer abandonment from Fulani's complete non-responsiveness to the agent's questions.
Id. at 459-60.
" In Terry, for instance, the Court noted that "whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Terry, 392
U.S. at 16. Just as one's freedom to walk away is restrained in the moment it takes to grab
a passerby, a permissible bus sweep transforms into an unsupported and illegal seizure the
instant the officers delay the bus.
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that suspicionless police-initiated drug interdiction encounters which delay citizens
before consent to search can be granted or denied constitute impermissible seizures
under the Fourth Amendment. That is, drug interdiction bus sweeps do not involve
the particular circumstances noted by the Court which tip the balance in favor of
validating some roadblocks.
Subpart 3 addresses bus sweeps directly. This Subpart shows that many bus
sweeps delay the departure of a bus, and explains the crucial but largely unexam-
ined significance of this fact. Though the Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue directly, this Subpart concludes that bus sweeps which delay the bus's
departure constitute impermissible seizures of all passengers.
1. Traffic Stops
Similar to Terry, the Supreme Court applies a two-pronged framework to
vehicle stops. Tracking the Terry determination that the "stop" portion of a "stop-
and-frisk" is a seizure, the stopping of a vehicle likewise constitutes a seizure.72
At the search prong, just as under Terry reasonable suspicion justifies only a
pat-down search for weapons (whereas probable cause will support a more
comprehensive search), the Court has established a line of decision that links the
situational factors surrounding a vehicle search, such as its duration and location,
to the level of justification needed to support the search.73
Delaware v. Prouse74 involved a random stop of a vehicle. The officer had
no particularized justification for the traffic stop; he simply had nothing better to
do than to pull the car over.75 Following the vehicle stop, the officer smelled
marijuana smoke in the car, and a subsequent search revealed the drug. 76 "At a
hearing... the patrolman testified that prior to stopping the vehicle he had observed
neither traffic nor equipment violations nor any suspicious activity, and he made
the stop only in order to check the driver's license and registration.""7 The Court
72 Colorado v. Banister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 n.3 (1980) ("There can be no question that the
stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.") (citing, inter alia Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
653 (1979)).
73 JOHNWESLEYHALL, JR., 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 17.1 (2d ed. 1991) ("Vehicle stops
as seizures can be viewed as a sliding scale - the greater the stop and intrusiveness, the
greater the justification needed .... "); see id. ("[A seizure] which is reasonable at its
inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and
scope .... The scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circum-
stances which rendered its initiation permissible.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20
(1968)).
74 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
11 Id. at 650-51
76 Id. at 650.
77 Id.
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reasoned that "[t]he marginal contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting from
a system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every vehicle
on the roads to a seizure, ' 8 and invalidated the stop, thus suppressing the evidence
of the narcotics possessed by the driver."
Prouse informs the proper analysis of consent searches in two ways. First, the
Court remarked that the Fourth Amendment was invoked "because stopping an
automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning
of [the Fourth Amendment], even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the
resulting detention quite brief."8" Prouse therefore teaches that a seizure attaches
immediately upon the driver's submission to legal authority. Accordingly, every
stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure for constitutional purposes. Similarly, when-
ever police accost citizens in open areas and where the citizen's engagement with
the officer - no matter how brief- results from the citizen's reaction to or respect
for the patrolman's official position, the encounter should be considered a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.
As noted above, the Court uses a "submission to lawful authority" formulation
to locate the point at which a citizen is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes.8'
Applying Terry stop analysis to police-citizen encounters on the street, it might
be helpful to consider others who accost pedestrians. Are police akin to lost
tourists asking for directions? Or are police more like pamphleteers trying to
press advertising upon passersby, many if not most of whom avoid the pamphle-
teer or reject his flyer? It seems reasonable to posit that police who attempt to
engage citizens for the purpose of conducting consent searches are more like the
unwelcome pamphleteer, though one with legitimate authority, than they are the
empathy-inducing tourist - even for the innocent person presupposed in Bostick.82
7 Id. at 661.
79 Id. at 663 (holding that vehicle stops not based on "at least articulable and reasonable
suspicion... are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment").
'0 440 U.S. at 653.
8' See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
82 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1991) (rejecting the argument that all
searches are seizures "because no reasonable person would freely consent to a search"). The
Drayton majority's hypothesis that people consent to searches because they "know that their
participation enhances their own safety and the safety of those around them," United States
v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205 (2002), was rightly decried by the dissent as having "an air
of unreality," id. at 208 (Souter, J., dissenting). A citizen who is not cari-ying illegal drugs
or weapons - Bostick's reasonable innocent person - knows his security is not heightened
by consenting to a hopeless search for nonexistent contraband. More likely, many who
"consent" to a futile search either feel violated by the police, think that the police would
search them whether or not they consented and wanted to avoid the hassle of saying "no," or
feel disappointed in themselves for not asserting their rights to the authority figures they have
been taught to obey their entire lives. See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and
the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SuP. CT. REv. 153, 201-03 (presenting survey evidence
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The degree to which a citizen would be more reluctant to ignore or brush off a
police officer than they would a pamphleteer - and common sense suggests the
difference in relative reluctance is significant" - is a reaction to the lawful
authority of the police and is rightly considered "submission.
84
The second way Prouse informs the proper analysis of consent searches is that
despite the widely-noted "vehicle exception" to the Fourth Amendment,85 the
Prouse Court concluded that vehicle stops to conduct license and registration
checks made on the chance that the officer might discover criminal wrongdoing
during the stop are not warranted absent an observable safety, registration, or
moving violation. 6 To be sure, such a stop and check would take at least a few
minutes to complete, but even brief delays of the few seconds it takes to ask a
single question can rise to a constitutional violation. 7 That a trivial unsupported
delay is an illegal seizure is highlighted by cases in which a legal vehicle stop is
extended in order to conduct a suspicionless consent search of it, a situation
analytically indistinguishable from departure-delaying bus sweeps.88
collected from motorists who consented to post-stop searches of their vehicles that support
each of the above propositions).
83 Indeed, manyjurisdictions have legally distinguished police officers from other citizens
in other contexts, such as by broadening a municipality's respondeat superior liability for
intentional torts committed by its police officers. See Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667,
671 (7th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases and reasoning that because an officer "is an authority
figure trained to develop and project an intimidating aura," municipalities should use special
care when choosing to hire someone for the job).
' The Drayton majority, perhaps unwittingly, indirectly acknowledged that citizens'
encounters with police are different and that citizens must summon some measure of
fortitude to deny a police request. The majority reasoned that "because many fellow
passengers are present to witness officers' conduct, a reasonable person may feel even more
secure in his or her decision not to cooperate with police on a bus than in other
circumstances." Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204. If reasonable citizens were no more deferential
to drug interdiction officers than to pamphleteers, there would be no reason to "have to feel
secure" in order to "not to cooperate with police."
85 See Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary
Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 751, 754 (citing
several examples of Supreme Court decisions recognizing a "vehicle exception" to the Fourth
Amendment).
86 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-63 (1979).
87 Recall that under Terry, a stop must be justified at the moment of its initiation, and "the
scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which
rendered its initiation permissible." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (quoting Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J. dissenting)).
88 See United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193, 198-99 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that an
impermissible Fourth Amendment seizure occurred when a vehicle was detained for some
"moments" after the reason supporting the probable cause-backed stop had terminated); see
also United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that delaying a
vehicle for three minutes after the traffic citation had been issued was impermissible).
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By the same token, open-area consent searches undertaken by narcotics
interdiction officers are conducted absent any particularized suspicion and have
no greater purpose than to discover routine violations of the law. 9 Even "quite
brief'" consent search encounters, then, should be closely scrutinized by courts to
assure that they are not in fact stops in which law enforcement officers leverage
their office to achieve compliance with their aims.
United States v. Whren,9" the leading "pretextual stop" case, illuminates the
argument presented here, though the case is not usually considered to be in the
"vehicle exception" class of cases.92 In Whren, the officers were vaguely suspicious
of the occupants of a vehicle, but did not have the quantum of suspicion necessary
to make a stop. The police trailed the vehicle until the driver committed a minor
traffic violation. The officers then made the traffic stop, not to issue a traffic
citation, but to conduct a "plain view" search of the vehicle.93 The Court refused
to inquire into the subjective motives of the officers and upheld the stop based on
the probable cause that the driver made a moving violation. 4
Police-initiated encounters in open areas do not have a direct analog to the
pretextual stops of vehicles, but police often follow citizens they think are acting
in a vaguely suspicious manner, or who fit a broad drug courier profile, 9 and select
89 Moreover, encounters with pedestrians do not involve the factors which form the
rationale for the "vehicle exception" (i.e., that vehicles are highly regulated as an initial
matter, and can be used as weapons or as a means of escape), however valid one finds the
exception.
' See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653.
91 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
9 Whren falls outside of the "vehicle exception" class of cases because the validity of the
stop had less to do with the fact that a car was involved than it did with the fact that a citizen
committed a minor, though arrestable, infraction. Compare Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S.
318, 326 (2001) (upholding a vehicle stop and arrest for a seat belt infraction), with
Hedgepeth v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 386 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding
the stop, arrest, and search of a twelve-year-old girl for eating a single french fry on a subway
platform).
13 Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
" Id. at 812 ("We flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the
agents of their legal justification.").
" See Charles D. Adler, Remarks, Is Our Drug Policy Effective? Are There
Alternatives?, 28 FORDHAmV URB. L.J. 3 (2000) (citations omitted):
What is profiling but a pseudo-scientific cover for searches based on
a hunch? Agents have often used the 'drug courier profile,' stopping
airport passengers because they were either the first or last person off
the plane, or because they were concealed in the middle; because they
were dressed well or shabbily; because they were traveling alone or
with others.
Id. at 94; see also United States v. Va Lerie, 2003 WL 21956437, at *5 (D. Neb. Aug. 14,
2003):
This court has heard every imaginable basis for searching so-called
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to initiate encounters with those citizens for the purposes of conducting consent
searches.96 This type of "target selection" ultimately leads to the police engaging
the citizen, the same result as with a pretextual vehicle stop. Just as the officers in
Whren were determined to investigate their targeted vehicle and were willing to
follow it until a pretext for the a stop arose,97 there is reason to suspect that a drug
interdiction officer will find a way to force a "consensual" encounter onto their
target citizens.98 However, though the Whren Court would not inquire into the
officers' motives for making probable cause-backed vehicle stops, police who
accost citizens for the purpose of conducting consent searches by definition do not
have the quantum of evidence to support the stop. If courts were to consider more
"suspicious" luggage: it is old, it is new; it had a handwritten
identification tag or it did not; it is a soft bag, a garment bag, a duffel
bag; the possessor is too nervous, too self-assured, too calm, too jittery;
the bags are overstuffed or they are underpacked.
Id.
96 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)
(No. 78-1821):
The operation of the airport surveillance program typically involves -
as it did in this case - three principal and recurring features: (1) the
initial contact with the suspect for questioning and identification, based
in large part on characteristics and patterns of behavior that the agents,
through their collective experience, have learned to associate with drug
couriers; (2) a request that the suspect move from the public areas of
the terminal to a nearby office if the agents believe that further
questioning is appropriate; and (3) a request in the office for a consent
to search the suspect's effects or person.
Id.
This general scenario for selecting citizens for consent searches, found not to be a
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes because Mendenhall was "free to leave" at any time,
appears to be standard operating procedure for narcotics interdiction agents today. See, e.g.,
Motion to Suppress Transcript, at 29, 30, United States v. Drayton, Case No. 4:99CR15-WS
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 1999) [Hereinafter Suppression Transcript] (on file with author).
Investigator Lang testified that he identified Drayton for a consent search when Lang noticed
Drayton wearing a "large jacket[ ] and baggy pants" in warm weather, the style of dress being
significant because "people have been known to conceal weapons or narcotics on their
person."
9" Common sense tells us that their wait would not be long. See David A. Harris,
"Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual
Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 582 (1997) ("Any time we use our cars,
we can be stopped by the police virtually at their whim because full compliance with traffic
laws is impossible.").
" For example, in United States v. Chacon, 330 F.3d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 2003), a customs
agent testified that he sought to re-engage bus passengers whose citizenship he had already
verified, but whose conversation was "awkward," stating, "I figured before I asked for
consent of the bags, I'll talk to them a little longer and establish maybe a little more
suspicion."
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closely the initial police-citizen encounter in a typical consent search scenario,
rather than let it pass under the constitutional radar, they might find that seizures -
however brief - result, but for which there is no supporting probable cause or
reasonable suspicion.99
2. Roadblocks
The Supreme Court's roadblock detention jurisprudence illustrates an
exception to the rule that police stops and delays of citizens must be supported
by a founded suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. In determining the reasonableness
of a given roadblock, the Court weighs the purpose for the roadblock against the
citizens' interest in traveling free of governmental interruption. In other words, the
analytical focus of the stop shifts from the reasonableness of the stated suspicion
an officer had of an individual citizen to a balancing of the official purpose for the
stop and search and the level of intrusion on the citizen.
Roadblock cases are particularly instructive in that the detentions are
analytically analogous to detentions from departure-delaying bus sweeps.
Because stopping at roadblocks is not optional, the stops result in Fourth
Amendment seizures, the reasonableness of which the Court has determined
calls for a situation-specific balancing test.'0° Roadblock detentions are prohibited
unless the governmental interest involved overrides the individual's liberty
interest to be free from official intrusions. If the balance tips toward the govern-
ment, the permissible duration of the delay lasts only so long as it takes to satisfy
the purpose; any longer delay of the citizen for another purpose transforms the
99 See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
("Approaching a person on the street (or at work, or on a bus) to ask a question causes him
to stop for at least the time needed to hear the question and answer (or refuse to answer); that
delay could be called a 'seizure,' though it has not been."). Alternatively, a state can erect
a framework of judicial scrutiny to protect citizens from invasive, but subconstitutional,
police-initiated encounters, as illustrated in the Conclusion.
"o The use of balancing tests in the context of the Fourth Amendment has been
predictably controversial. Civil libertarians call for bright-line Fourth Amendment
protections while opposing scholars maintain that absolute rules are unworkable in the Fourth
Amendment context. Compare George M. Dery III, Are Politicians More Deserving of
Privacy than Schoolchildren? How Chandler v. Miller Exposed the Absurdities of Fourth
Amendment "SpecialNeeds" Balancing, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 73,88 (1998) (condemning Fourth
Amendment balancing as "not truly analysis at all. It merely demonstrates whether or not as
few as five members of the Court value a particular government action.") with, William J.
Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016
passim (1995) (contending that balancing is necessary, but advocating a shift away from
privacy-based balancing toward a substantive review of police use of force). This Article
does not enter this debate, but merely acknowledges balancing as a feature of the Fourth
Amendment landscape.
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seizure from legal to illegal. Courts should subject departure-delaying bus sweeps
conducted for the purpose of interdicting drugs to the same analysis.
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,°' the parties stipulated that the brief
checkpoint stops to detect illegal aliens were seizures under the Fourth
Amendment."°2 To determine whether reasonable suspicion is a prerequisite to a
valid stop, the Court balanced the government's interest in controlling immigra-
tion against the "motorists' right to 'free passage without interruption. '" 0 3 Finding
that "[w]hile the need to make routine checkpoint stops is great, the consequent
intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is quite limited," the Court held that
brief Border Patrol checkpoint stops within one hundred miles of the Mexican
border could be made absent reasonable suspicion."° Similarly, in Michigan v.
Sitz, 10 5 sobriety checkpoint stops which delayed motorists an average of twenty-five
seconds were deemed seizures made absent reasonable suspicion." The Court
then balanced the interests of the parties to determine whether the sobriety
checkpoints were constitutional.0 7 Weighing the significant state interest in
eradicating drunk driving against the slight intrusion on motorists, the Court found
the program consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 8 However, absent reasonable
suspicion, a permissible roadblock seizure becomes a Fourth Amendment violation
as soon as a vehicle is delayed beyond the time necessary to satisfy the permitted
inquiry. "
Unlike Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, the governmental interest in detecting
narcotics through bus interdictions which detain passengers without reasonable
suspicion is not sufficient to overcome the passengers' interest in traveling freely.
Similarly, police-initiated encounters of citizens in open areas for the purpose of
conducting consent searches are undertaken without the quantum of suspicion
necessary to support a stop. As these roadblock cases instruct, the length of
101 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
102 Id. at 556. The Border Patrol had erected a checkpoint to detect illegal aliens
approximately fifty miles north of the Mexican border. All vehicles were required to stop,
and all occupants asked to produce evidence of their citizenship status. Id.
103 Id. at 557-58 (citation omitted).
'04 Id. at 557.
105 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
106 Id. at 448.
107 Id. at 451-54.
108 Id. at 455.
109 Martinez-Fuerte, 496 U.S. at 567; see United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d
425, 433 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting in the context of immigration checkpoints that the
"permissible duration of the stop is limited to the time reasonably necessary to complete a
brief investigation of the matter within the scope of the stop"). Although the Fifth Circuit
would not parse the individual questions asked by agents in the process of ascertaining the
occupants' nationality, the court noted that once the purpose of the checkpoint was satisfied,
any further detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 434.
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detention is immaterial to the analysis - a Fourth Amendment seizure attaches the
moment a vehicle is stopped or its departure is delayed without reasonable
suspicion after the legal purpose for the roadblock lapses.
In the roadblock at issue in Indianapolis v. Edmond,"' cars were stopped for
an average of "five minutes or less" at narcotics checkpoints located according to
crime statistics and traffic flow data."' Searches of the stopped cars were
conducted by consent, or based on the particularized suspicion raised by a drug-
sniffing dog."2 Balancing the occupants' interest in unimpeded travel against
the government's interest in intercepting crime, the Court ruled the narcotics
checkpoint detentions unconstitutional because their "primary purpose" was "to
uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."'" 3
Edmond presents a clear tipping point which places on the unreasonable side
of the scale police "stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present
possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist
has committed some crime.""' 4 Similarly, departure-delaying bus interdiction
detentions should not be sustained merely because they may turn up contraband,
nor should courts countenance open area consent searches conducted in a way such
that an average citizen would view the encounter as mandatory. In such cases, the
government has not demonstrated that narcotics interdictions serve a purpose
other than general crime detection and control. The window of opportunity for
engaging in consensual encounters on buses, then, lapses at the point the bus is
detained from departing by the interdiction officers and no governmental interest
of overriding importance can be summoned to fill the void left by the absence of
reasonable suspicion. Likewise, a police-initiated encounter of a pedestrian that
a reasonable citizen would feel obliged to engage in should be considered an
impermissible seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.
3. Bus Sweeps
Bus sweeps allow one to isolate the initial encounter stage of a typical consent
search scenario for two reasons. First, unlike consent searches conducted in open
areas or attendant to vehicle stops which may arise spontaneously and be more
variable, bus interdictions are scripted, routinized events, and therefore, the
officers' initial approach of seated passengers varies little from case to case."'
"0 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
1' Id. at 35.
I2 id. The Court has consistently held that a canine sniff is not a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 40.
11 Id. at 42.
114 Id. at 44. The Edmund reasoning thus tracks that of Prouse. See supra notes 74-79 and
accompanying text.
"' See Callahan, supra note 4, at 396-97 n.156.
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Second, and more important for this analysis, bus searches that delay the departure
of the bus necessarily engender passenger delay. Should the Supreme Court be
squarely presented with the issue, its precedents dictate that interdiction officers
"seize the bus" and all its passengers at the moment the bus is delayed from
departing. Such a seizure rule can be exported to open area consent searches,
causing courts to scrutinize all police-initiated encounters more closely to determine
whether even a brief delay of a pedestrian is the result of the officer leveraging his
authority.
The bus in the first of the two Supreme Court bus sweep cases, Florida v.
Bostick,' " 6 was described as being "about to depart""' 7 and "scheduled to depart,"
' 18
but there was no indication that the officers in fact delayed the bus. The Bostick
majority therefore sidestepped the issue" 9 and analyzed the case solely on the
subconstitutional plane of police-citizen encounters. 2° Although Drayton made the
"delay equals seizure" argument' 2' and, as discussed below, the factual record
indicated that it was more likely than not that the police delayed the departure of
the bus, the Supreme Court again ignored the issue. The Court, then, has not yet
decided whether drug interdiction agents who delay a bus's departure thereby
seize the passengers for Fourth Amendment purposes. However, every federal
court that has addressed the issue, both pre- and post-Bostick, has indeed indicated
that an impermissible seizure occurs in such situations.
A trio of pre-Bostick cases recognized that a police-imposed delay of a bus
departure implicates the Fourth Amendment. Three years before Bostick, in
United States v. Rembert,'22 the court denied the motion to suppress evidence
procured during a bus sweep on finding that the agents did not delay the bus,
though it accepted the magistrate's legal determination that if "the police
conduct at this point caused fare-paying passengers to be delayed from
proceeding on their established journey, [it would] constitute[ ] a seizure of their
persons and effects."' 23 Similarly, in denying a motion to suppress, the Eleventh
116 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
I1 d. at 435.
1,8 Id. at 436.
,, The Supreme Court traditionally does not decide constitutional issues not placed
squarely before it, preferring to exercise the "passive virtue" of restraint. See Alexander M.
Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, 79 (1961) (emphasizing "the
wide area of choice open to the Court in deciding whether, when, and how much to
adjudicate"). This self-restraint is believed to guard the Court's legitimacy by cabining its
role to adjudication, leaving policymaking to the elected branches of government.
120 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434 (noting that such encounters "will not trigger Fourth
Amendment scrutiny unless [they] lose [their] consensual nature").
12' Brief for Respondents at 29-30, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (No.
01-631).
122 694 F. Supp. 163 (W.D.N.C. 1988).
123 Id. at 175.
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Circuit in United States v. Fields'24 noted that a seizure occurs if "the officer is
delaying the progress of the bus, and interfering with the public's right to travel, a
right long recognized in this country as fundamental."'' 21 In United States v.
Flowers,126 the Fourth Circuit panel found that "the officers did not delay the bus
beyond its customary layover.., and that any deviation from its written schedule
of departure was caused by the bus company."' 2 7 However, the court later noted
that:
Flowers' freedom to leave thus encompassed not only the
freedom to depart from the bus, but the freedom to depart
with the bus, which police officers in the absence of some
articulable suspicion must allow. To hold otherwise would
begin to transform this free society into one where travelers
must present papers or proffer explanations to be on their
way.128
Shortly after Bostick, the Ninth Circuit highlighted the distinction between
bus interdictions which engender delay and those which do not. In United
States v. Gonzalez,'2 9 the court found that no seizure occurred when an officer
boarded the bus at a red light and conducted consent searches on the moving bus
because no passengers were "prevent[ed] . . . from going on their way."' 3°
Conversely, police encounters with passengers on a bus which prevent the bus
from departing or continuing on its scheduled route should be considered
"seizures" conducted without reasonable suspicion, prompting a Fourth
Amendment balancing test of the bus sweep's reasonableness. Therefore, bus-
delaying interdictions conducted for the "primary purpose" of "uncover[ing]
ordinary criminal wrongdoing"'' - that is, all bus sweeps - would not survive
the balancing test under Edmond.'3
124 909 F.2d 470 (11 th Cir. 1990).
'z Id. at 474 n.2.
126 912 F.2d 707 (4th Cir. 1990).
127 Id. at 711.
121 Id. at 712.
129 979 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1992).
130 Id. at 713. Though illustrative of the "delay equals seizure" argument, the Gonzalez
decision strains the "free to leave" principle of Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). To avoid
an encounter with an interdiction officer, a passenger approached on a moving bus would not
have the option of deboarding until the interdiction was completed. The passenger would be
forced to remain seated and ignore the questioning officer standing over him, and would still
not be considered "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes.
' Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000).
131 See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
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United States v. Barrett'" is directly on point. In Barrett, the court invalidated
a narcotics interdiction procedure because it caused the bus to be delayed a short
time. Judge Carr wrote:
I find that it is more likely than not that the bus was due to
depart as the encounter between Sgt. Ellenwood and the
defendant was occurring. In light of that finding, I also find
that but for the delay caused by that encounter, the bus would
have departed before the encounter was completed. As a
consequence of the instruction to the driver [not to depart until
the police procedure was completed], I find, accordingly, that
the defendant and the other passengers were "seized," as that
term is used in the Fourth Amendment."
Likewise, in United States v. Ellis,' a border patrol agent, working from front
to back, satisfied himself that all of the bus passengers were legally in the
country.136 A slight delay for this purpose was allowable under Martinez-Fuerte.137
On the way out, the agent turned to drug interdiction, using a "squeeze and sniff"
technique on the carry-on bags in the overhead racks. The Fifth Circuit held that
this suspicionless delay of the bus's departure, though only "trivial," became
impermissible under Edmond once the agent's "primary purpose" turned to drug
interdiction. 38
Departure-delaying bus sweeps are in no way isolated or uncommon
occurrences. Indeed, such bus sweeps may be the rule rather than the exception.
Interdiction officers have three opportunities in which to conduct bus sweeps:
(1) upon a bus's arrival at a depot, before passengers disembark; (2) at short layover
depots, after departing passengers have exited and new passengers have boarded;
and (3) at longer layover depots, after passengers have reboarded. The first
scenario presents the Guapi problem in which the Eleventh Circuit feared that the
interdiction officers acted as gatekeepers, allowing only searched passengers to
disembark, 139 and thus appears to be the least constitutionally palatable of the three.
133 976 F. Supp. 1105 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
134 Id. at 1108.
135 330 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2003).
136 Id. at 680.
117 Id. at 679-80.
138 Id. at 681; see United States v. Chacon, 330 F.3d 323, 328-39 (5th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that an agent may not re-engage a passenger whose immigration status was
already established to inquire about drugs - questions that could be asked in a matter of
seconds).
139 United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393, 1396 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (noting as a significant
factor that the interdicting officer blocked the egress of passengers who were naturally "eager
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The second and third scenarios offer only short windows of time for officers to
conduct bus sweeps. Common sense holds that passengers will want to minimize
the amount of time they are in the cramped confines of a bus, and will therefore
either get off the bus (if in the second scenario the layover is long enough to do
so) or wait until a few minutes before departure to reboard (the third scenario).
The interdiction in Drayton is typical of bus sweeps following the third scenario,
and a detailed review of the factual record indicates the important facts to be
established at future bus sweep trials.
The Drayton interdiction began at approximately 12:40 p.m.' 40 The scheduled
departure time for the bus was 12:45 p.m., 41 so the agents had about five minutes
in which to conduct the interdiction before their presence would delay the depar-
ture of the bus. Investigator Lang, the lead interdiction officer, testified that the
agents were on the bus for fifteen to twenty minutes which was "just long enough
to check... two or three people.' 42 Accordingly, each consent search took five
to ten minutes to complete. The agents approached three passengers, searching
two of them, before approaching Drayton.' Lang further testified that the three
encounters and the two searches were conducted consecutively; the next passenger
was not approached until the prior encounter and search was completed.'
44
Investigator Blackburn, an agent who did not testify, made the first contact and
search, and "[iun the meantime, [Lang] was standing there waiting until [Blackburn]
got finished."'' 45 Lang then spoke briefly with a second passenger, and after
deciding that he "didn't want to check that particular person," Lang made contact
with a third passenger and conducted a consent search of that passenger's
luggage.'" To this point, the bus interdiction, begun at 12:40 p.m. of a bus with a
scheduled departure of 12:45 p.m., had entailed two five-to-ten-minute searches
made consecutively, sandwiched around a brief discussion with a third passenger.
Drayton and his co-defendant were the fourth and fifth passengers approached
by the narcotics interdiction team. 47 Lang's contact with Drayton, then, most
likely began between 12:50 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. That is, before encountering
Drayton the officers had delayed the bus's departure between five and fifteen
to depart as quickly as possible"). The Supreme Court's Drayton decision did not abrogate
this aspect of Guapi in any way.
140 Offense Reporting Form, at 3 (on file with author). This is the record of Drayton's
arrest completed by the arresting officers.
"" This was the departure time noted on Drayton's ticket, which was lodged with the
Supreme Court (on file with author).
142 Suppression Transcript, supra note 96, at 39.
14 Id. at 17-19.
'4 Id. at 16.
145 Id,
'46 Id. at 17-20.
147 Id. at 19-20.
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minutes. Although Lang testified that he never remains on a bus so long as to delay
its departure, 4" he contradicted this assertion by noting that sometimes the bus
driver is standing beside the bus when the officers get off and that "[wihen we see
the driver coming up, we are usually about finished, or we're getting ready to
get off the bus anyway."'49 Given the short amount of time the officers had to
complete the interdiction before its scheduled departure and the number of
passengers contacted and searched before Drayton was approached, the interdict-
ing officers very likely detained the bus a minimum of several minutes before Lang
began his encounter with Drayton.
The Supreme Court did not address the bus-delaying aspect of Drayton because
Drayton's trial attorney was unable to conclusively establish that fact either in his
cross-examination of Lang or through documentary evidence. 5 The defense had
only Lang's testimony which suggested that the bus sweep probably delayed the
departure, and Lang stated that the interdiction did not delay the bus. Lang did not
take witness statements from other passengers, and there were no passenger
manifests from which defense counsel could identify potential witnesses. 5' Neither
148 Id. at 38.
Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
o People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202 (I11. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S.
Apr. 5, 2004) (No. 03-923), which the Supreme Court will hear during the October 2004
Term suffers similar ambiguity. In Caballes, after a motorist stopped for speeding refused
to consent to a search of his car, a second officer arrived with a canine unit to sniff the
exterior. While the officer was writing a warning ticket, the dog alerted on the trunk, and a
subsequent search revealed marijuana. 802 N.E.2d at 203. It is unclear whether the
involvement of the canine unit prolonged the stop. The Illinois Supreme Court, which "has
construed the search and seizure language found in section 6 [of the Illinois Constitution] in
a manner that is consistent with the Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence," Fink
v. Ryan, 673 N.E.2d 281, 288 (I11. 1994), applied Terry and ruled that the dog sniff
impermissibly broadened the scope of the stop because there were no articulable facts to
support the use of a canine unit. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 204-05.
Whether the use of the canine unit prolonged the stop was not conclusively established,
so the only question granted certiorari was: "Whether the Fourth Amendment requires
reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle
during a legitimate traffic stop." See Brief for Petitioner at i, Caballes (No. 03-923). Every
current Supreme Court Justice, save Justice Thomas, who has not addressed the issue, agrees
that a dog sniff of a car is not a Fourth Amendment search. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.
32, 40 (2000) (6-3 decision) ("The fact that officers walk a narcotics-detection dog around
the exterior of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does not transform the seizure into
a search."); id. at 52-53 (Rehnquist, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting on other grounds); id. at 56
(Thomas, J., dissenting and not reaching the issue). Because probable cause supported the
traffic stop and because a dog sniff is not a search, the facts of Caballes do not implicate
either Terry prong directly. The Supreme Court will very likely reverse the Illinois Supreme
Court, perhaps unanimously.
"' Suppression Transcript, supra note 96, at 18.
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the bus driver nor any other employee or official of the bus company was available
to testify whether the bus sweep delayed the departure of Drayton's bus before Lang
discovered the narcotics.
As discussed above, all prior federal case law indicates that at the moment an
interdiction procedure delays the departure of a bus beyond its scheduled departure
time, the interdiction transforms from a series of consent-based police-citizen
encounters to an impermissible seizure of all of the passengers. Therefore, defense
counsel in future bus sweep cases should endeavor to establish that the interdiction
in question delayed the bus's departure, and if successful, argue that such delay
tainted any subsequent discovery of contraband.
B. Summary
The bus locus is unique among the settings in which a consensual police-citizen
encounter may culminate in a search request because, unlike encounters which take
place in open areas, at one's place of work, or attendant to a stop of a motor vehicle,
police often delay bus passengers from their travels as a group, in effect "seizing"
individuals, some of whom the police have not yet approached. Distinguishing
consensual encounters, which do not implicate the Fourth Amendment, from
Terry stops, which are Fourth Amendment seizures and must be supported by a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, or have a primary purpose
that outweighs citizens' liberty interests, is derived from a fact-intensive analysis.
Analogously, once a bus interdiction passes from a pre-departure procedure to a
departure-delaying exercise, the business of the passengers changes from waiting
for departure to progressing to their destination. Thus, at the point the presence of
interdiction officers blocks the bus's departure and progress, they necessarily
"seize" all the passengers and do so absent reasonable suspicion.
In the context of a police-initiated encounter in an open area, "[tihe person
approached. . . need not answer any question put to him; indeed he may decline
to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way."'52 The above discussion
has shown that the same cases which teach that impermissible seizures attach the
moment a bus is delayed by police conducting a bus sweep suggest that even trivial
police-initiated delays of citizens in open areas, if the result of the officer's
leveraging of his position of authority, should invoke constitutional scrutiny.
IMl. PERCEPTIVE QUIRKS IN SUPPRESSION HEARINGS
The previous Part explored one of the last remaining windows for bus sweep
defendants in federal court, or in state courts whose search and seizure rules are
'52 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (plurality opinion) (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968)).
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coextensive with the United States Supreme Court's consent search jurisprudence,
to be granted a motion to suppress. By contrast, this Part will be of use only to
defense counsel in state courts which interpret their respective state constitutional
search and seizure provisions to be more restrictive of police actions in conducting
consent searches.' This Part discusses the perceptive mechanisms at play in
consent search scenarios, and seeks to reconcile the seemingly diametrically
opposed views of the tenor of on-bus encounters held by drug interdiction officers
and those of the drug carrying passengers caught by them. This Article concludes
by applauding New York State's approach to suspicionless police-initiated
encounters with citizens as a more nuanced appreciation of the "deviously subtle"'"
official coercion police can exert on citizens to elicit their consent to a search
request.
To be sure, self-interest plays a large role in how one portrays an encounter
on the witness stand. Officers portray the encounters as friendly and consensual
in order to validate the arrest, and drug couriers naturally attempt to characterize
the police behavior as coercive. However, psychological research suggests that
more than bald self-interest is at play, and that each of the three players -
defendants, judges, and police - face perceptive hurdles which impede an accurate
understanding of a given encounter. Quirks in human perception tend both to
amplify the degree to which an observer (judge) attributes an actor's (defendant-
passenger) consent to his inherent characteristics rather than to the situation
surrounding the police-citizen encounter, and to blunt the officer's self-perceived
level of coercion he exerts on passengers. An understanding of these psycho-
logical mechanisms in consent search encounters provide avenues of argument for
defense counsel and considerations for state court judges' decision making under
state constitutional provisions.
A. Attribution Theory and the Perspective of Defendants and Judges
During the oral argument in Bostick, Justice Marshall asked: "[Wihy do dope
pushers plead guilty ... I mean when I have got dope on me, and I say search me,
am I not pleading guilty?""' Justice Marshall addressed his rhetorical question
in his dissent, reasoning that Bostick's on-bus "guilty plea" was elicited by
... See Stephanos Bibas, The Real-World Shift in Criminal Procedure, 93 CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 789, 803 (2003) (discussing case books' treatment of the states as
"laboratories of experimentation" in criminal procedure); see generally BARRY LATZER,
STATE CONSTrrUTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 1 (1991) (discussing the evolution of
"adequate state grounds doctrine" by which the Supreme Court must accept state courts'
interpretations of their own laws).
' People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 577 (N.Y. 1976).
'5 Transcript of Oral Argument, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (No. 89-1717).
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coercive interdiction officers.1 6 Though my student note agreed with Justice
Marshall's decision, it posited an alternative answer to his question at oral
argument. Applying the results of controlled consent search research studies
which found college students did not realize the legal consequences of consenting
to a search,' I reasoned that drug couriers simply "do[ I not grasp the legal
implications of consenting to a search. It is entirely possible that drug-transporting
bus passengers mistakenly believe that by voluntarily turning the drugs over to
police, they either can not, or will not, be prosecuted."'58
Although fundamental unawareness of the contours of the Fourth Amendment
likely is a significant factor when drug couriers grant consent to search, attribution
theory offers an equally compelling answer to Justice Marshall's question.
According to attribution theory, whereas defendant "actors" are inclined to
attribute their consent to situational factors such as the location of the search or
the behavior of the police officer, "observer" courts are more likely to validate the
consent by attributing it to the personal characteristics of the defendant.' That
is, whereas drug couriers attribute their consent to the situation - such as the
confines of a bus, the presence of multiple officers conducting the sweep, the
model of fellow passengers consenting to searches, and fear of being left behind
and separated from their luggage if they deboard - judges are more likely to
attribute a courier's consent to the disposition of the accused. Thus, attribution
theory not only answers Justice Marshall's question at oral argument, it suggests
a more nuanced alternative to Bostick's argument that "no reasonable person would
freely consent to a search of luggage that he or she knows contains drugs."'" The
... Bostick, 501 U.S. at 446, 450 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that the interdiction
in question "exhibit[ed] all of the elements of coercion associated with a typical bus sweep"
and concluding that "the Fourth Amendment clearly condemns the suspicionless, dragnet-
style sweep of buses").
' Professor Kagehiro found that although ninety-six percent of the study participants
understood the concept of a search warrant and ninety-two percent understood that absent a
search warrant, the police could conduct a search only with the participants' consent, only
forty-nine percent of the subjects understood that any contraband discovered would be
admissible evidence in court. Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Perceived Voluntariness of Consent to
Warrantless Police Searches, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 45-46 (1988). Apparently,
the subjects of the study reasoned - incorrectly - that if they freely disclosed contraband,
the police would "reward" them by not using the contraband as evidence in court, that such
use would be "unfair" given the cooperation the subjects had shown.
Callahan, supra note 4, at 397 n.157.
159 See Thomas C. Monson & Mark Snyder, Actors, Observers, and the Attribution
Process, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 89, 91-93 (1977) (tracing the development of
attribution theory and recapping the results of studies in the field).
'60 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438. The majority rejected this argument noting that the
reasonable person' test presupposes an innocent person." Id. This reasoning seems
inapposite. Given the low "hit rate" interdiction officers achieve, and that presumably few
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alternative suggested by attribution theory is that due to police-created situational
factors, a reasonable person would consent to a search he knows will reveal drugs.
At first glance, it may be easy to accept a court's denial of a motion to suppress
evidence claimed to be the result of police coercion, the claim being self-serving
on the part of the defendant or simply arguments in the alternative forwarded by
defense attorneys. Attribution theory reconciles the disconnect between the
defendant's perception of coercion and a court's determination that consent was
granted voluntarily.'6 ' The lengthy sentences defendants often face if their motions
to suppress fail 6 2 tend to exacerbate the actor-observer disconnect concerning
both the perceived freedom of choice of the defendant'63 and the attribution of
passengers would prefer to be frisked than to be left alone by police, reasonable innocent
persons no doubt give dubious "consent" to search in much greater numbers than do
reasonable guilty persons. See Suppression Transcript, supra note 96 at 36, 50 (Lang
testifying that he had found contraband on passengers about thirty times in the thousands of
searches he conducted over three years).
161 See Monson & Snyder, supra note 159, at 91. "[T]here is a pervasive tendency for
actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute
the same actions to stable personal dispositions." Id. (quoting E.E. JONES & R.E. NESBETr,
THE ACTOR AND THE OBSERVER: DIVERGENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 80
(1972)). This finding is especially damaging to a defendant's claim since "misattribution
experiments have consistently shown that both actors and observers tend to overestimate the
degree with which decisions are based on dispositional factors and underestimate the pull of
situational conditions on behavior." Id. at 94. This disconnect is analogous to the "argentic
shift" experienced by subjects in Professor Stanley Milgram's famous obedience
experiments. An argentic shift occurs when a subject no longer views his actions as self-
determined, but rather as a result of the wishes of an authority figure. See STANLEY
MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTALVIEW 132-34 (1969); see also id.
at 41 (noting that observers consistently underestimated the obedience exhibited by subjects
even though the observers were fully aware of all the situational factors of the experiment
being conducted); Dorothy K. Kagehiro & Ralph B. Taylor, Exploring the Fourth
Amendment: Searches Based on Consent, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 24
(Dorothy K. Kagehiro & William S. Laufer eds., 1992) (finding in a controlled study of third-
party consent searches that "consent may be attributed by the consentor to the coerciveness
of the situation and may be attributed by an observer (the judge) to the voluntary willingness
of the consentor").
162 See, e.g., United States v. Stephens, 206 F.3d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting district
court sentence of 240 months in prison for bus passenger caught transporting cocaine);
United States v. McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320, 1324 (7th Cir. 1996) (120 months in prison and
five years probation for the same offense).
163 See John H. Harvey et al., Actor-Observer Differences in the Perceptions of Re-
sponsibility and Freedom, 32 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 22, 24-27 (1975). The
researchers found "strong support" for the hypothesis that the greater the consequence of an
actor's (defendant's) behavior, the less freedom of choice he would perceive having while
finding "directional support" for the hypothesis that observers (courts) would perceive the
actor as having greater freedom of choice as the consequences became more severe. Id.
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responsibility for that choice."6 Thus, when asked to consent to a search that
may ultimately result in a lengthy prison sentence, the voluntary nature of a
defendant's consent is jeopardized on two fronts. As perceived by the defendant,
his consent becomes more predicated on external situational conditions; from the
bench's perspective, the consent is more likely to be perceived as resulting from the
disposition of the defendant. In other words, precisely the same factors that lead a
judge to perceive consent as having been voluntarily given also cause a defendant
to have felt coerced into acquiescing to an officer's search request.
Furthermore, that a defendant chose to take a bus does not necessarily change
the equation under attribution theory, as the Supreme Court has suggested it
does.'65 The Court made much of the fact that Bostick chose to travel by bus, and
that therefore he brought upon himself the coercion he claimed in being confined
by the cramped interior.' In concluding "Bostick's freedom of movement was
restricted by a factor independent of police conduct,"' 67 the majority acknowledged
that Bostick's consent was, at least in part, due to this situational factor.' 61
Nonetheless, by remanding the case the Court was willing to accept that Bostick's
consent was voluntary.'69 Conversely, the Bostick dissent tacitly applied
attribution theory more directly by recognizing the importance of the situational
factor independent of the fact that it was Bostick's choice to travel by bus. 7 ' The
same divide occurred in Drayton, with the majority going so far as to posit that a
" See id. at 24-25. The researchers reported "strong evidence" that as the consequences
of the behavior became more severe, the actor would be more likely to attribute the decision
to situational factors while noting a "general tendency" for observers to attribute more
responsibility to the disposition of the actor as stakes rise. Id.
165 See Monson & Snyder, supra note 159, at 96-102. The researchers note: "Individuals
normally have considerable freedom to choose where to be, when and with whom. Thus, the
situational factors to which they respond are often of their own making, although these
factors may still powerfully constrain the behavior of the actor once in the situation." Id. at
97-98 (citation omitted).
166 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (concluding that any duress felt by
Bostick due to the bus's confines "was the natural result of his decision to take the bus");
accord United States v. Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
the passenger's "freedom of movement was the natural result of his choice of transportation
and seat assignment, not a result of [the agent's] conduct").
167 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.
168 See id. at 439 ("The cramped confines of a bus are one relevant factor that should be
considered in evaluating whether a passenger's consent is voluntary.").
169 See id. at 440.
170 See id. at 450 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (charging that it is unacceptable "for the police
to force an encounter on a person by exploiting his 'voluntary decision' to expose himself
to perfectly legitimate personal or social constraints"); see also United States v. Stephens,
206 F.3d 914, 918 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding significant that the drug interdiction agents
had spotted the defendant in the bus terminal because "the STING officers could have
approached Stephens in a less confined, and therefore less coercive, environment").
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passenger may more readily deny a search request on a bus than in an open area' 7 '
while the dissent likened the interdiction officers' decision to confront Drayton on
the bus to three officers accosting a pedestrian in a narrow alley.' 72
Attribution theory encompasses a consentor's perceptions of relative attrac-
tiveness and certainty of outcomes,' timing, 174 and risk 7 1 to help to explain why,
when a search is virtually certain to reveal narcotics in one's luggage, a passenger
may nonetheless consent to a search.' 76 From an actor's perspective, the higher
the degree of certainty, the greater the disparity of attractiveness between out-
comes, and the less time the actor takes in making a decision, the more constrained
the actor's perceptions of freedom of choice become.' In the paradigmatic bus
sweep scenario, all of these factors align to create a situationally driven response
on the part of the passenger. It seems (1) certain that the searching officer will find
the contraband, (2) being allowed to continue one's bus trip is much more attractive
than being arrested and facing ten years or more in prison, (3) bus searches happen
quickly, necessitating on-the-spot decisions by travelers, and (4) as for risk, if
getting caught transporting drugs is perceived as a "low-probability event, it [is]
basically ignored and [is] not guarded against."'7 This helps explain why
passengers often seem so unprepared to deny police requests to search luggage.
From an attribution theory perspective, the usual context and procedure of bus
sweeps adds to an already-formidable situationally driven perceived lack of
choice on the part of a passenger. The lessons of attribution theory are usually lost
on post-hoc appellate courts focused on the .'reasonable person' test [which]
presupposes an innocent person."'
179
17' United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 199, 204 (2002).
172 Id. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting).
"' See John H. Harvey & Shawn Johnston, Determinants of the Perception of Choice, 9
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL 164, 171 (1973) (finding a greater perceived choice where
there is a smaller difference in outcomes).
174 See id. ("[P]erceived choice will be greater the more time a person takes in selecting
an action.").
175 See Kagehiro & Taylor, supra note 161, at 28-30.
176 See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 961 F.2d 1361, 1362 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding
voluntary consent to search suitcase containing five pounds of marijuana); Pennsylvania v.
Vasquez, 703 A.2d 25, 28 (Pa. 1997) (finding voluntary consent to search backpack contain-
ing 29.3 grams of cocaine and a digital scale).
1 See Harvey & Johnston, supra note 173.
178 Kagehiro & Taylor, supra note 161, at 28.
'79 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,438 (1991) (emphasis omitted). The Court raised the
innocent person standard in response to Bostick's claim that his consent must have been
coerced because no reasonable person carrying contraband would have consented. However,
having confronted the standard knowing that Bostick was indeed carrying drugs centered
attention on Bostick and perhaps crystalized a finding on remand that his consent was due
to dispositional factors. Additionally, it also may have deflected attention from the possibility
that even a "reasonable innocent person" would have felt coerced to consent to a search. See
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To be sure, if attribution theory were applied forcefully across-the-board,
every consent to search granted during a bus sweep would be considered the
product of unconstitutional situationally driven coercion. Whether such a result
would be wise,180 attribution theory should be considered in the precise work
demanded in case-by-case adjudication. A general awareness of attribution theory
on the part of defense counsel and judges may be enough to tip decisions in
defendants' favor in close cases.
B. Self-Perceived Application of Force and Drug Interdiction Officers
Justice Kennedy wrote in Drayton that in order to have a vigorous Constitution,
citizens sometimes have to assert their rights to police. He reasoned that "[ilt
reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes
and for the police to act in reliance on that understanding."'' Justice Kennedy's
tacit assessment that passengers can freely reject a police request seemed plausible
given that the Supreme Court accepted the district court's finding that "[t]here
was nothing coercive, there was nothing confrontational" about the encounter
between Investigator Lang and Drayton.'82 Because the legality of consent search
encounters turns on the coerciveness with which officers interact with passengers,
Tracey Macin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 723, 801-02 (1992) (criticizing the reasonableness inquiry in Bostick as
a "legal abstraction" which de-emphasized the coerciveness of the Bostick bus sweep and
suggesting that the coercive factors highlighted in Justice Marshall's dissent would pressure
any targeted person, guilty or innocent). This is precisely the result reached on similar facts
by the Ninth Circuit in Stephens: "What we conclude is that no passenger, innocent or guilty,
would have felt free to refuse to answer the officers' questions while remaining on the bus."
United States v. Stephens, 206 F.3d 914, 917 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000).
180 Even the Bostick majority questioned the effectiveness of the war on drugs. "If that war
[on drugs] is to be fought, those who fight it must respect the rights of individuals, whether
or not those individuals are suspected of having committed a crime. By the same token, this
Court is not empowered to forbid law enforcement practices simply because it considers them
distasteful." Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439.
'8' United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (citation omitted). To the degree
that Justice Kennedy's formulation assumes that police and citizens are on equal footing in
consent search encounters, he is likely mistaken. Law enforcement are prototypical authority
figures in society and are the repeat-playing experts in bus searches. Police assigned to bus
depots conduct several bus sweeps every day whereas even regular bus passengers will be
infrequent targets. See Suppression Transcript, supra note 96, at 50 (Investigator Lang
testifying that he had been conducting bus sweeps on about twenty-eight buses per week for
three years by the time he searched Drayton). If a vigorous Constitution needs to be
nourished by knowledge periodically, then requiring police to inform passengers of their
Fourth Amendment rights during scripted, routinized bus searches seems to be as good an
opportunity as any to start.
1"' Drayton, 536 U.S. at 200.
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however, officers have a great incentive to portray their encounters with citizens as
friendly and nonconfrontational. To that end, at Drayton's suppression hearing,
Lang testified about his demeanor when engaging passengers:
Well, I'm talking to the gentleman, or whoever I'm in contact
with at that time. I'm talking to that particular person. I'm not
trying to talk to everybody else. My total focus is to that partic-
ular person. I'm not talking loud. I'm being as friendly and
courteous, and I'm using, "How you doing?" This type of- the
tone of voice that I'm using. I'm not trying to be coercive -
trying to sound like I'm a big, bad cop or anything like that. I'm
just talking to them in a nice tone of voice.'8 3
Recent research suggests that more than conscious obfuscation may be
involved when officers give such self-serving testimony. Because human brains
may be wired to perceive self-generated forces as weaker than those of the same
magnitude generated by others," s in their suppression hearing testimony police
may be truthfully and conscientiously reporting their self-perceived demeanor
during an encounter with a citizen as having been friendly, while the citizen may
have perceived the same demeanor as threatening.
To test perceptions of self-generated versus external force, neuroscientists at
the University College London placed torque motors exerting a constant force to
volunteers' left index fingers, and asked the participants to match that amount of
force with their right index fingers by pressing a measuring device.' 5 Every one
of the participants overestimated the force required to match that of the torque
motor. I 6 That is, though the participants perceived the force they exerted as
matching the force they received, in fact every participant projected more force
than they endured.
When police are conducting bus sweeps, their mission is to root out drugs
and identify drug couriers by getting people to consent to searches. Applying
the finding from the torque motor experiment to bus sweeps such as the one in
Drayton, when Lang puts his "total focus" on a "particular person" in doing his job,
though he perceives his own demeanor as "friendly and courteous," it may be
perceived by a passenger as closer to the demeanor of a "big, bad cop" intent on
183 Suppression Transcript, supra note 96, at 26.
184 Sukhwinder S. Shergill et al., Two Eyes for an Eye: The Neuroscience of Force
Escalation, 301 SCIENCE 187 (July 11, 2003), available at www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/
Full/301/5630/187.pdf.
185 id.
186 id.
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accomplishing his goal.' 87 To be sure, this perceptive quirk by itself will not be
dispositive of the coerciveness of the interdiction officer's demeanor in a
particular bus sweep, but again, an awareness of this natural tendency could tip
a court's seizure determination in close cases.
The disconnect in relative perceptions of force the neuroscientists identified
tends to escalate over multi-stage encounters. In a follow-on experiment, the
researchers asked pairs of volunteers to take turns pressing a lever with the same
force that had just been exerted on them. Even though the "instructions were
designed to achieve parity," "[i]n all cases, the forces escalated rapidly."'' 88 That
is, with every pair of participants, the initial force exerted by Participant 1 was
exceeded by Participant 2 on his first turn, which in return was exceeded by
Participant 1 in round 2, and so on. The researchers concluded that in these "tit-
for-tat exchanges," "both sides are reporting their true percept and that the
escalation is a natural by-product of neural processing."' 89 The researchers posited
that this mental glitch explains why physical conflicts, such as playground
disputes, tend to escalate as each child thinks the other hit him harder. 9 '
In the bus sweep context, it seems reasonable to assume that passengers are
skeptical of the police presence on a bus, at least initially.' 9' Faced with mild
reluctance from passengers, police will naturally, and imperceptibly to them-
selves, ratchet up the urgency with which they ask for consent. 92 The multi-round
nature of police questioning in bus sweeps can be seen in the increasingly intrusive
series of search requests officers often make to passengers,'93 of which Drayton is
a prime example.'94 As a consent search progresses and becomes more intrusive,
'87 See Suppression Transcript, supra note 96, at 50.
i88 Shergill et al., supra note 184 (finding a "38% mean escalation on each turn" over
eight turns).
189 Id.
190 Id.
'9' See Suppression Transcript, supra note 96, at 59. Lang testified that "[o]n that bus
people don't like giving out their name and don't like giving out information in reference to
what they're doing." Id.
192 See id. at 40. Lang posited that when faced with a nonconsenting passenger, he might
respond, "I understand, and we would like for your cooperation, but you don't have to." Id.
9 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784,788 (D.D.C 1990), rev'd, 921 F.2d
1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (describing such a series of questions directed at raising the
passenger's level of "anxiety and duress" and concluding that "most citizens ... cannot,
given the circumstances, say 'No' or otherwise refuse to comply with a police officer's
request").
'9" Suppression Transcript, supra note 96, at 27-31. Lang first asked whether Drayton had
any luggage before asking to search Drayton's bag. Lang then asked to check Drayton's
person. Lang started with Drayton's upper torso and chest before asking Drayton to lean
forward so Lang could search lower. Only then did Lang search Drayton's waist, hips, and
groin area. Id.
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the neuroscience of force escalation teaches that an officer will naturally become
more insistent in his questioning if he is confronted with resistence from the
passenger at any stage. And here is the key: the officer will not even perceive that
his behavior is becoming more coercive. Therefore, he can honestly testify at the
suppression hearing that his demeanor did not change from the friendly baseline
he perceived it to be at the start of the encounter.
CONCLUSION: THE NEW YORK MODEL FOR SUBCONSTITUTIONAL POLICE-
INITIATED ENCOUNTERS
Part III illustrated one psychological quirk affecting the perspective of each
of the three players in a suppression hearing -judge, defendant, and officer -
that tend to fog a clear picture of the tenor of a police-initiated consent search
encounter with a citizen. Importantly, each works to influence the court to deny
a defendant's motion to suppress. Consistent with attribution theory, a judge is
more likely to attribute a defendant's consent to a search to the defendant's
disposition, indicating the consent was voluntary, whereas the defendant is more
likely to attribute his consent to situational factors surrounding the encounter, most
of which are chosen by interdiction officers, indicating the "consent" was coerced.
And consistent with the force escalation findings, police naturally underestimate,
and therefore truthfully under-report on the witness stand, the amount of force
they exert on a given passenger.
Part II showed that, unlike consent searches that take place on buses, at
roadblocks, or following traffic stops, all of which give rise to unconstitutional
seizures the moment police detain citizens without proper cause, consent searches
in open areas lack such a definitive demarcation point. Due to self-serving bias in
testifying, perceptive quirks, and myriad other hurdles to accurately re-creating
the tenor of a given consent search in the antiseptic environs of a courtroom,
courts have few guideposts to help them determine whether citizens acquiesced
to the coercive authority of an officer requesting consent to search, or voluntarily
consented to a search request."'
Further hindering a richer understanding of consent searches in federal courts
and state courts which have adopted the federal rules of decision, is that Terry is
a binary switch which affords no nuance below the high constitutional threshold
it sets. The result under the Court's narrow interpretation of the word "seizure" to
mean "submission to lawful authority" and not mere deference shown to these
'95 Part 1I posited that one could profitably conceptualize the level of a citizen's
submission to police authority as a measure of the marginal difference in obligation to
interact that a reasonable, innocent person would sense between facing a normal pamphleteer
and one wielding legitimate authority, with the voluntary consent pole likened to the
willingness with which one would give directions to a lost tourist.
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authority figures, is that police have wide berth to accost citizens and ask pointed,
invasive questions, including a request to search the person and his belongings,
without invoking the Constitution.
Into the consent search breach left by the Supreme Court's tolerant creation of
a huge sea of "below Terry" police-initiated encounters, New York State's highest
court, quite sensibly, has detailed two subconstitutional tiers "for evaluating the
propriety of encounters initiated by police officers in their criminal law enforce-
ment capacity."'' 96 The New York Court of Appeals realizes that police-initiated
encounters with citizens are fundamentally different from encounters between
citizens. Therefore, it singles out encounters for the purpose of crime prevention
for the most rigorous judicial scrutiny because "this function is highly susceptible
to subconstitutional abuses."' 97 The Court of Appeals does not rely on federal or
state constitutional grounds. Rather, the court's decisions "reflect[] [its] judgment
that encounters that fall short of Fourth Amendment seizures still implicate the
privacy interests of all citizens and that the spirit underlying those words required
the adoption of a State common-law method to protect the individual from arbitrary
or intimidating police conduct."' 8
In People v. Hollman, the Court of Appeals differentiated simple police
requests for information from the more intrusive common-law right of inquiry. 99
Under Hollman, police who have any "objective, credible reason, not necessarily
indicative of criminality,"2 "0 can approach citizens and ask "basic, nonthreatening
questions regarding, for instance, identity, address or destination.""2 ' New York
courts thus allow police to approach citizens almost at will, as police elsewhere
do, in choosing targets for consent searches. For instance, under the low "request
for information" threshold, the fact that Drayton was wearing a large, bulky jacket
on a warm day2° surely would have been a credible enough reason for an officer
in New York to approach Drayton and ask "a few general, nonaccusatory
questions."20 3  In this vein, the Court of Appeals has noted that a person
"permitting others to board a bus ahead of him on two occasions, looking around
'9 People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 205 (N.Y. 1992) (citing People v. DeBour, 352
N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976)).
197 DeBour, 352 N.E.2d at 569.
'9' Hollman, 590 N.E.2d at 212. Of course, relying on the search and seizure provision of
its state constitution, a state's highest court could grant citizens broader protection against
intrusive consent search questioning by lowering the threshold of what constitutes a seizure
to a level below the Terry standard - restraint by show of authority - established by the
Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 51.
'99 Hollman, 590 N.E.2d at 205-06.
200 Id. at 205.
201 Id. at 206.
202 Suppression Transcript, supra note 96, at 77.
203 See Hollman, 590 N.E.2d at 211.
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while doing so, and then patronizing a snack bar" may have supported a "request
for information," but no more.2°4
The second subconstitutional level, which the Court of Appeals has called "a
wholly separate level of contact," is a "common-law right of inquiry, [which] is
activated by a 'founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits a
somewhat greater intrusion." 2 5 The Hollman panel repeatedly emphasized that
an officer's search request must be supported by such "founded suspicion,"2 °"
because "[n]o matter how calm the tone of narcotics officers may be, or how polite
their phrasing, a request to search a bag is intrusive and intimidating and would
cause reasonable people to believe that they were suspected of criminal conduct."2 °7
New York's framework for analyzing subconstitutional police-initiated
encounters thus addresses many of the shortcomings inherent in applying the
reasonable suspicion-backed "Terry stop" model to the fundamentally different
situation presented by suspicionsless consent search scenarios.2"8 Though New
York's approach may not eliminate unwarranted police questioning, it should
dampen the use of dragnet-style bus sweeps and random police-initiated encounters
with citizens for the purposes of conducting consent searches.
Recognizing that "[d]ue to the tendency to submit to the badge and our belief
that the right to be left alone is 'too precious to entrust to the discretion of those
whose job is the detection of crime,"' 2 9 the Court of Appeals has fashioned
workable measures that protect all citizens from random, invasive police question-
ing. New York's rule that requests to search must be supported by "founded
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot" may temper the biases related to attribution
20 In re Antione W., 556 N.Y.S.2d 560, 561 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); but see People v.
Saunders, 173 A.D.2d 239 (N.Y. 1991).
205 Holiman, 590 N.E.2d at 205 (quoting DeBour, 352 N.E.2d at 571).
206 Hollman, 590 N.E. 2d at 206 ("Once the officer asks more pointed questions that
would lead the person approached reasonably to believe that he or she is suspected of some
wrongdoing and is the focus of the officer's investigation, the officer is no longer merely
seeking information."); id. at 210 ("Once the police officer's questions become extended and
accusatory and the officer's inquiry focuses on the possible criminality of the person
approached, this is not a simple request for information.").
207 Id. at 210. Under New York's two-tiered approach, although the police could have
approached Drayton and made "nonaccusatory" inquiries, they could not have made a more
intrusive request to search because Drayton's choice to wear a heavy jacket in Florida was
susceptible to the innocent interpretation that the bus was destined for Indianapolis, Indiana.
See DeBour, 352 N.E.2d at 567 ("[I]nnocuous behavior alone will not generate a founded
or reasonable suspicion that a crime is at hand.").
208 New York retains Terry's threshold for police to effect a short seizure and limited
search, thus the analysis in Part II showing that even brief seizures made absent reasonable
suspicion constitute Fourth Amendment violations holds in New York as well.
209 DeBour, 352 N.E.2d at 569 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455
(1948)).
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theory presented in Part II.A by enabling courts to better scrutinize the initial
encounters between police and citizens that occur antecedent to a search request.
Perhaps more importantly, the main beneficiaries of the two-tiered "below Terry"
framework will be the innocent citizens who constitute the vast majority of all
citizens subjected to drug interdiction officers' intrusive questioning and
unwitting application of force during bus sweeps and other police-citizen
encounters which culminate in intrusive search requests, but who are invisible to
courts. This benefit is also the best argument for other states to adopt their own
variant of New York's subconstitutional model for analyzing consent searches.
